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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the effects on citizen security caused by the Colombian military’s 
actions during Plan Colombia and its successor plans. Military actions are often evaluated 
according to their effect on state security, but the concern of this thesis is whether or not 
the advantages of military security actions outweighed the costs for Colombian citizens. 
The military benefited citizens by weakening the insurgency and increasing state 
presence across Colombia’s territory, but the military’s involvement also incurred costs, 
including human rights abuses and large numbers of internally displaced persons. 
Considerable disagreement exists over the final value of the military’s involvement, as it 
does over many aspects of Plan Colombia. This thesis seeks to add some clarity to the 
debate, with a focus on military operations’ effects on civilians’ lives, while also asking 
what the Colombian experience can teach the United States (and other countries) about 
counterinsurgency. Overall, this thesis finds that the use of the Colombian military during 
Plan Colombia improved citizen security, and furthermore that the United States played a 
positive role in this outcome. 
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“From Failed State to Tourist Haven: If only Iraq, Russia, and Libya were more 
like … Colombia.”1 That is the title of a 2014 newspaper article by Matthew Kaminski in 
The Wall Street Journal. Though many might debate the labels “failed state” and/or 
“tourist haven,” the article’s title nonetheless captures the sense of dramatic turnaround 
that many hold concerning Colombia. It is partly this idea of turnaround that makes 
Colombia a relevant topic of study today. Many, including Kaminski, see the country as a 
model for other states that are experiencing their own insurgencies.2 There are plenty of 
people on the other side who argue that Colombia is not a model worth following.3 There 
is not, however, a shortage of locations for applying successful counterinsurgency 
lessons; so, which side of the debate is correct (or which aspects of each side), matters. 
This thesis assesses the debate over Plan Colombia4 by investigating if the 
Colombian military’s actions improved the security of Colombian citizens. Military 
actions are most often interpreted with regard to their effect on the state’s security, but 
this thesis analyzes the military’s effects on the citizenry and asks whether or not the 
benefits of military security actions outweighed the costs for Colombian citizens. The 
benefits of the Colombian military’s involvement have come in various forms, including 
                                                 
1 Matthew Kaminski, “From Failed State to Tourist Haven: If only Iraq, Russia and Libya were more 
like … Colombia,” Wall Street Journal, 8 September 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/from-failed-state-
to-tourist-haven-1409872739?mod=Opinion_newsreel_6. 
2 See Peter DeShazo, Tanya Primiani, and Phillip McLean, Back from the Brink: Evaluating Progress 
in Colombia, 1999–2007 (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007); Thomas 
A. Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency: Uribe’s Colombia (2002–2006),” Military Review 87, no. 2 
(March 2007): EBSCO Host accession no. 25012950; Mark Moyar, Hector Pagan, and Wil R. Griego, 
Persistent Engagement in Colombia, JSOU Report 14-3 (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: The JSOU Press, 
2014). 
3 See Adam Isacson, “Colombia: Don’t Call it a Model,” Washington Office on Latin America, 13 
July 2010, http://www.wola.org/publications/colombia_dont_call_it_a_model; Samir Elhawary, “Security 
for Whom? Stabilization and Civilian Protection in Colombia,” Disasters 34, (October 2010): S388-S405, 
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7717.2010.01211.x; Oeindrila Dube and Suresh Naidu, “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: 
The Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia,” (Working paper 197, Center for Global 
Development, Washington, DC, January 2010). 
4 Unless otherwise noted, for simplicity “Plan Colombia” is used to refer to the strategy that was 
launched in 1999 by Colombian President Pastrana, officially titled Plan Colombia, and to the follow-on 
plans, both Colombian and U.S., that have continued the work of the original. 
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a greatly weakened insurgency and increased state presence across Colombia’s territory. 
The costs of the military’s involvement include human rights abuses against civilians and 
massive internal migration, with resulting poverty, due to the three-way fighting between 
the military, the insurgents, and the paramilitaries. Considerable disagreement exists over 
the value of the military’s involvement, as it does over many other aspects of Plan 
Colombia (including basic questions, such as if security improved and what the sources 
of insecurity were). This thesis aims to add to our understanding of the security situation 
in Colombia, with a focus on the effects of military counterinsurgency operations on the 
lives of normal civilians, but also with an eye toward what the Colombian experience can 
tell the United States about its involvement in counterinsurgencies, especially its use of 
U.S. military members to train or advise foreign militaries. In the end, this thesis finds 
that the use of the Colombian military during Plan Colombia increased citizen security, 
and furthermore that the United States played a positive role in this outcome. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature concerning Plan Colombia falls mainly into two categories. The 
first category argues that Plan Colombia was a great success, that it brought significant 
gains in peace and security to the country, and that it could prove useful as a template 
elsewhere. The second category argues that there was no great success, that the claims of 
peace and security are exaggerated or wrong, and that Plan Colombia is not a good 
template for other countries facing insurgencies. Representative of the second category, 
Adam Isacson declares, “Copying [Colombia’s] model elsewhere would be disastrous.”5 
Both sides agree that there was at least some improvement in the country’s security 
during Plan Colombia and that there are still many problems facing the country, but the 
two camps remain divided on the value of the security improvement, particularly 
regarding the lives of the rural poor. Additionally, the impact of the United States’ 
contributions is debated. Interpretations of the United States’ impact tend to be divided 
into two sides, following the same lines as interpretations of the plan’s success: those 
who believe Plan Colombia was a success view U.S. contributions as positive, and those 
                                                 
5 Isacson, “Colombia: Don't Call it a Model.” 
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who believe it was a failure view U.S. involvement negatively. The next section describes 
the two main camps regarding Plan Colombia (pro and con), and then addresses the 
literature on the U.S. military’s contribution to the effort. 
The proponents of Plan Colombia emphasize statistics describing a reduction in 
violent actions committed by the guerrilla forces fighting against the state. Certain 
examples recur frequently. Among these are reductions in murders, kidnappings, oil and 
electricity infrastructure attacks, and an increase in the numbers of guerrillas and 
paramilitary members killed, captured, or induced to desert, and an increase in the 
number of people using national highways.6 Certainly, the quoted figures look 
impressive. According to Peter DeShazo, Tanya Primiani, and Phillip McLean, the 
number of murders in Colombia decreased by 40% from 2002 to 2006 and the number of 
kidnappings declined by 80% from 2000 to 2006.7 Concerning electricity and oil attacks, 
they point out that “attacks on electricity towers, mainly committed by guerrillas, 
declined from 483 in 2002 to [an annualized figure of 114 for] 2007 and only 39 
bombings of oil pipelines were recorded during the first eight months of 2007 [an 
annualized figure of 59] compared with a peak of 184 in 2003.”8 The United States 
Government Accountability Office notes that ridership on Colombian roads increased 
from just under 100 million riders in 2000 to a little over 160 million riders in 2006.9 The 
reduction in the membership of non-state violent organizations has been significant 
(though exact numbers are difficult to obtain). As an example, the Government 
Accountability Office estimates that the FARC lost approximately 53% of its 
membership between 2001 and 2008.10 The proponents of Plan Colombia point to 
numbers like these and claim success, though with the caveat that much more needs to be 
done since even the dramatic gains have not brought insecurity down to a desirable level.  
                                                 
6 DeShazo, Primiani, and McLean, Back from the Brink, 15–20; Jess Ford, Plan Colombia: Drug 
Reduction Goals Were Not Fully Met, but Security Has Improved; U.S. Agencies Need More Detailed 
Plans for Reducing Assistance (GAO-09-71) (Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability 
Office, 6 October 2008), 5, 24, 35, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-71.  
7 DeShazo, Primiani, and McLean, Back from the Brink, 18. 
8 Ibid., 17. 
9 Ford, Drug Reduction Goals, 24. 
10 Ibid., 25. 
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Detractors of Plan Colombia acknowledge the improvement in the figures noted 
above, but they point to other figures that they say indicate the plan did not succeed. 
Human rights violations and the presence of large numbers of internally displaced 
persons figure prominently for this camp, as do economic factors and the continuing 
high, albeit reduced, levels of violence in the country. Authors such as Isacson cite the 
millions of Colombians displaced in the 2000s, a problem that continues today, as 
evidence that supposed security gains are not really accomplishing much.11 The violence 
conducted by right-wing paramilitaries, in combination with their connections to the 
Colombian government, provides another argument for those who see Plan Colombia as 
less than successful.12 Colombia’s purported success is also attacked in terms of equality. 
Critics state that UN statistics indicate that Colombia was one of only three Latin 
American states to become more unequal between 2002 and 2008, based on the Gini 
coefficient.13 (In fact, the World Bank calculations of the Gini coefficient actually show 
the opposite trend for Colombia during the same period, claiming Colombia became 
more equal.)14 Despite the disagreement on the exact coefficient or trend, both agree that 
Colombia is highly unequal, with the World Bank ranking it tied for 143rd out of 155 
evaluated states.15 For the detractor camp the negative conditions that persist in Colombia 
in spite of Plan Colombia mean the successes of the plan are hollow at best and that, in 
the words of journalist Milburn Line, “The FARC insurgency may keep itself going 
indefinitely with drug money. The next $7 billion from Washington could do a lot more 
for social development and a peace process in Colombia.”16 
                                                 
11 Isacson, “Colombia: Don't Call it a Model.” 
12 Forrest Hylton, “Plan Colombia: The Measure of Success,” Brown Journal of World Affairs 17, no. 
1 (Fall/Winter 2010): 107–108, Business Source Complete, EBSCO host (accession number: 60576434). 
13 United Nations, Social Panorama of Latin America 2009 (Santiago, Chile, 2009), 54. 
14 The World Bank, “World Development Indicators,” The World Bank DataBank, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=world-
development-indicators. 
15 The World Bank, “Distribution of Income or Consumption (Table 2.9),” World Development 
Indicators, The World Bank, 23 September 2013, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.9#. 
16 Milburn Line, “Counterpoint: A New Plan for Colombia,” International Herald Tribune, 19 August 
2010, http://search.proquest.com/docview/744499339?accountid=12702. 
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Like the major data points just mentioned, the material contributions of the United 
States to Plan Colombia are well documented, but how much of the change in the 
Colombian situation was the result of U.S. contributions is difficult to determine. This 
appears true for all aspects of U.S. aid (money, equipment, personnel), and certainly for 
U.S. military training efforts. In his review of the literature on Colombia, Jonathan 
Catalano found that “while there are several articles extolling the importance of foreign 
assistance, few articles attempt to evaluate its impact using empirical evidence. Of the 
few articles that do utilize empirical evidence, there is polarization among opinions 
regarding the effectiveness of foreign assistance as a tool to pursue strategic security 
objectives.”17 In Catalano’s efforts to add to the empirical study of foreign assistance, he 
concludes that, “funds that were applied to long term military expansion proved to be the 
most effective starting point for reducing the prevalence of illegal activity (both illicit 
crops and leftist guerrilla groups).”18  
Rather than using empirical analysis, many authors base their findings on specific 
cases where success was achieved and the United States was involved, using such cases 
to demonstrate that the United States had a positive effect. The Government 
Accountability Office’s October 2008 report on Plan Colombia provides a typical 
example: “U.S. assistance has increased the Colombian military’s overall operational 
capability, in particular, its air mobility. These enhanced capabilities have contributed to 
a number of achievements including the Colombian military’s seizure of hundreds of tons 
of illicit drugs, an estimated 50% reduction in FARC combatants since the outset of Plan 
Colombia, and the extension of the government’s presence.”19 Mark Moyar, Hector 
Pagan, and Wil R. Griego follow a similar pattern in their assessment of the training 
efforts of U.S. special operations forces during Plan Colombia. They claim success for 
the training because the trained Colombian units participated in the (successful) attempts 
at improving security.20 Moyar, Pagan, and Griego assert a definite increase in the 
                                                 
17 Jonathan R. Catalano, “The Efficacy of Foreign Assistance in Counter Narcotics,” (Master’s Thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2013), 7, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/32803. 
18 Catalano, “Efficacy of Foreign Assistance,” 44. 
19 Ford, Drug Reduction Goals, 6. 
20 Moyar, Pagan, and Griego, Persistent Engagement. 
 6 
professionalism, effectiveness, and capacity of the Colombian military, which in turn 
generated more citizen security and fewer human rights violations. Unfortunately, they 
do not attempt a more general and empirical determination of gains or losses in citizen 
security (or any other measure) resulting from the use of special operations forces. 
Instead, they focus solely on the qualitative aspects of engagement by U.S. special 
operations forces.21 
Some empirical work has been done, but it is limited. The RAND Corporation 
provides an empirical study of U.S. security aid, but it is a statistical analysis of security 
cooperation provided by the United States to 107 countries from 1991-2008.22 Colombia 
is part of the study and figures prominently in their case studies, but specific findings are 
not reached for Colombia (or any one state). Furthermore, the RAND study does not 
separate the military from the other components of security cooperation so no direct 
lesson is available concerning military training efforts in particular. Nonetheless, the 
RAND study does find that there is a “statistically significant correlation between U.S. 
[security cooperation] spending on average and improvement in the recipient country’s 
fragility.”23 (RAND uses the State Fragility Index of the Center for Systemic Peace. 
Fragility is defined by the level of “effectiveness and legitimacy across four development 
dimensions: security, political, economic, and social.”24) They also find that the amount 
of correlation varies with the type of security cooperation, with non-materiel aid 
producing strong correlation and materiel aid producing no correlation.25  
While the preceding study suggests that security aid is generally beneficial (and 
that the Colombian situation is in line with the positive findings), other studies find a 
negative impact from military aid. One such study, by Oeindrila Dube and Suresh Naidu, 
finds that paramilitary attacks increased in relative measure in municipios with 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 1. 
22 Michael J. McNerney et al., Assessing Security Cooperation as a Preventive Tool (Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2014), xiv. 
23 Ibid., 93. 
24 Monty G. Marshall and Benjamin R. Cole, Global Report 2014: Conflict, Governance, and State 
Fragility (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2014), 33, www.systemicpeace.org/globalreport.html. 
25 McNerney et al., Assessing Security Cooperation, 93. 
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Colombian military bases following the introduction of U.S. military aid, while guerrilla 
attacks were unaffected. Additionally, the study discovered that U.S. military aid reduced 
voter participation in these same areas (municipios with Colombian military bases).26 In 
explaining their outcome, these two authors focus on the potential movement of monetary 
and materiel aid from the military to the paramilitaries as a result of government-
paramilitary collusion.27 These findings give strong support to the detractors of Plan 
Colombia specifically, and of U.S. military aid generally. 
Despite the relatively abundant amount of literature concerning Plan Colombia 
and related subjects, the fact remains that there is still considerable disagreement over the 
true effects of military action on citizen security, and what lessons can be learned from 
Plan Colombia. Convincing arguments fall on both sides of the main positive-negative 
divide, even within the few empirical studies. The contradictory nature of the opposing 
studies and the low amount of objective evidence make a clear call for further study of 
the issue, especially given the potential to improve the situation of unstable countries 
based on lessons from Colombia’s apparent success. 
B. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The hypothesis of this paper is that Colombian military actions during Plan 
Colombia improved citizen security overall. The complicated situation surrounding Plan 
Colombia, however, allows for many explanations and hypotheses regarding the effects 
of the various attempts to improve conditions in Colombia.  
The first set of alternative explanations, as suggested by the literature review, 
directly opposes the hypothesis of this thesis. These arguments claim that the military 
was detrimental to citizen security, or that there was no improvement in security. The 
main alternatives of this type are addressed in the body of the thesis, especially in 
Chapter III. 
                                                 
26 Dube and Naidu, “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots,” 26. 
27 Ibid. 
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Other hypotheses agree that citizen security improved in Colombia, but assert that 
the military cannot take the credit. One such explanation might assert that the reason 
citizen security improved was that Colombia’s economic growth during the period of 
Plan Colombia reduced criminal activity. According to the World Bank, Colombia’s 
GDP per capita grew from $2,503.50 in 2000 to $7,763.00 in 2012 (figures in 2014 U.S. 
dollars), which is a 210% increase.28 (For comparison, the following is a sampling of 
countries showing their own GDP per capita increase for the same years, again in 2014 
U.S. dollars: Chile: 197%, Ecuador: 287%, Mexico: 49%, Peru: 228%, Venezuela: 165%, 
United States: 41%.)29 What effect this economic growth had on Colombia’s violence is 
a complicated problem to work out.30 There is not space in this thesis to adequately 
explore the topic (though it does merit exploration), and furthermore, since the growth in 
Colombia was not outside the norm for the region, and because Plan Colombia was based 
on the idea that a lack of security was at the root of Colombia’s other problems, focusing 
on the effects of security changes rather than economic changes is most appropriate 
here.31 
Another possible alternative to the hypothesis of this thesis might question the 
metrics used to conclude that Plan Colombia is a success. This was done in one manner 
by the Dube and Naidu study discussed earlier, but there are still other possible 
alternatives to the standard success story. One alternative is that the oft-referenced 
improvements in murders, kidnappings, and highway traffic were a result less of 
government success and more of the huge internal displacement of people in Colombia. 
Increased security in certain regions may have allowed people to flee the more dangerous 
zones, leading to a decrease in murders and kidnappings, but at the expense of the 
                                                 
28 The World Bank, “World Development Indicators.” 
29 Ibid. 
30 See: Niclas A. Krüger, “The Impact of Economic Fluctuations on Crime: A Multiscale Analysis,” 
Applied Economics Letters 18, no. 2 (2011): 179, http://search.proquest.com/docview/849245239? 
accountid=12702; Richard Rosenfeld and Robert Fornango, “The Impact of Economic Conditions on 
Robbery and Property Crime: The Role of Consumer Sentiment,” Criminology 45, no. 4 (2007): 735, doi: 
10.1111/j.1745-9125.2007.00096.x; Mingming Pan, Benjamin Widner, and Carl E. Enomoto, “Growth and 
Crime in Contiguous States of Mexico,” Review of Urban & Regional Development Studies 24, no. 1–2 
(March 2012): 51, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-940X.2012.00188.x. 
31 Elhawary, “Security for Whom?” 402; Marks, “Model Counterinsurgency,” 54. 
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creation of millions of refugees.32 Such a trade-off would not be considered a success by 
many, and it is likely to create its own security problems over time. A detailed analysis of 
Colombia’s internal displacement is also outside the scope of this thesis, though it is 
closely tied to security issues and is definitely a subject worth further investigation. 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis is a single case study examining the effects of Colombia’s military on 
citizen security from 2000 to 2013. A case study is indicated by the research question 
because the question is focused specifically on the effects of the military, with a desire to 
discover lessons that could be applied to states facing similar challenges. Case studies 
such as this one are useful because they augment broader statistical work to determine 
trends in security cooperation. The wider statistical studies may indicate that security 
cooperation tends to be helpful, but case studies aid in improving the effectiveness of 
security cooperation by promulgating lessons learned. This thesis was conducted as a 
desktop study between July 2014 and May 2015 using publicly available material. 
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Following this introduction, Chapter II addresses the main argument of this thesis, 
defines citizen security, and explains the main sources of insecurity for citizens in 
Colombia during the period in question. It then describes the Colombian military’s role in 
combating these sources of insecurity and how its actions improved citizen security. 
Chapter III addresses the main critiques of the assertion that the military improved 
security. Specifically, it discusses concerns over the methodology used to support the 
case, as well as concerns over the negative effects of military actions, and over the 
potentially uneven social distribution of effects. Chapter IV looks at U.S. military 
involvement in Plan Colombia and some of the lessons from this experience that might be 
of benefit in other situations. Chapter V summarizes the thesis in a conclusion. 
                                                 
32 See Gabriel Rojas Andrade and Paola Hurtado, “Grupos posdesmovilización y desplazamiento 
forzado en Colombia: una aproximación cuantitativa” [Demobilized groups and forced displacement in 
Colombia: A quantitative approximation], Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, 
http://www.codhes.org/images/Articulos/GPD_y_desplazamiento_forzado_en_Colombia.pdf. 
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II. THE MILITARY AND IMPROVED CITIZEN SECURITY 
DURING PLAN COLOMBIA 
This chapter examines the debate over Colombia’s value as a positive 
counterinsurgency example. We assume that the main purpose of the state is to protect 
the rights of its citizens, and that these rights include protection from harm by other 
individuals. As such, a state faced with an insurgency that harms its citizens has a duty to 
counter the insurgency and restore citizen security. In this context, this chapter considers 
the state of citizen security in Colombia and whether the Colombian government’s use of 
its military improved citizen security during the years of Plan Colombia. We first 
describe some of the major sources of insecurity in Colombia, for both the citizens and 
the state. We then turn to the military’s role in combating these sources of insecurity, 
with primary attention given to insurgency, especially the FARC. Next, we examine the 
changing nature of citizen security during the Plan, and argue that the military did 
contribute to improved citizen security by severely weakening one of the main sources of 
insecurity (the guerrilla groups) and by returning a large amount of territory to state 
control. The security gains resulting from the military were not unmitigated. The military 
itself committed acts of violence against citizens, and the regaining of territorial control 
did not translate automatically into the establishment of effective state institutions that 
could maintain the security gains and further develop them. Furthermore, the security 
gains came primarily during the early 2000s, and the security situation has since 
stagnated, even worsened by some measures, since then. Nevertheless, the overall 
changes in citizen security demonstrate a positive effect from the actions of the military. 
A. CITIZEN SECURITY DEFINED 
Since it is one of the central concepts of this thesis, and because it does not have a 
single, widely recognized definition, the term “citizen security” needs to be defined 
before proceeding further. Security can encompass many different aspects of life, but in 
an attempt to keep the definition manageable and meaningful this thesis follows the 
United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) lead in defining the term as “the 
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protection of life and of people’s physical and material integrity.”33 The UNDP 
emphasizes that citizen security is not merely reducing the rate of crime and violence; it 
is also the creation of government policy that fosters the development of citizens such 
that they eschew crime and violence.34 This thesis agrees, but since the emphasis here is 
on the military, a branch of the government that is focused on the immediate provision of 
security, this thesis focuses on the reduction of rates of crime and violence and largely 
leaves matters of development aside (not because they are unimportant, but because they 
are outside the scope of this study). In order to reduce crime and violence the Colombian 
government needed to reestablish legitimate state presence throughout its territory and to 
end the operations of major illegal armed groups (including the FARC); this is what Plan 
Colombia was designed to do.35 
B. MAJOR SOURCES OF INSECURITY 
In 1999, when Plan Colombia was announced, the Colombian state had been 
fighting leftist insurgencies for over three decades. Communist militant and peasant self-
defense groups started the FARC in the mid-1960s to fight against the Colombian 
government, which had excluded the far left from the power-sharing agreement that 
ended the conflict between the Liberals and Conservatives, known as La Violencia.36 
Since then the FARC have moved outside their philosophical roots and has developed as 
a criminal organization that earns money through drug trafficking, extortion, kidnapping, 
                                                 
33 United Nations Development Programme, Regional Human Development Report 2013–2014 
Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America (Panama: Regional 
Service Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2013), 4, http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ 
librarypage/hdr/human-development-report-for-latin-america-2013-2014/. The Development Programme 
also includes an “individual’s right to lead life with dignity” (5) in its full definition, but this thesis leaves 
dignity out of the equation since it is a poorly defined concept and even the Development Programme’s 
own report does not address how dignity relates to security. 
34 Ibid., 5. 
35 Marks, “Model Counterinsurgency,” 54; Ford, Drug Reduction Goals, 1. 
36 Nazih Richani, “Caudillos and the Crisis of the Colombian State: Fragmented Sovereignty, the War 
System and the Privatization of Counterinsurgency in Colombia,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 
406, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4017705; Danielle Renwick and Stephanie Hanson, “FARC, ELN: 
Colombia’s Left-Wing Guerrillas,” Backgrounders, Council on Foreign Relations, updated 1 December 
2014, http://www.cfr.org/colombia/farc-eln-colombias-left-wing-guerrillas/p9272. 
 13 
and even illegal gold mining.37 Over the decades, the strength and wealth of the FARC 
grew such that by the late 1990s the FARC were strong enough to directly challenge the 
Colombian state, including the military. The FARC had both size and skill: membership 
in the early 2000s is estimated to have been at its peak strength, with between 16,000 and 
20,000 personnel, and they were an effective enough fighting force that they were 
capable of conducting, and winning, offensive battles against the military.38 In the late 
1990s, as part of its long-term strategy for overthrowing the state, the group moved from 
traditional guerrilla tactics to directly challenging the Colombian military in mobile 
warfare. This began with attacks on small, isolated forces, but the FARC quickly proved 
that they could threaten and defeat large Colombian forces in pitched battles. One of the 
more famous (and infamous for the Colombian military) examples is the 1998 ambush at 
El Billar, where approximately 450 guerrillas ambushed 153 soldiers from one of 
Colombia’s elite mobile brigades and over the course of three days killed 62 of them, 
while capturing 43 and dispersing the rest.39 Defeats like this raised serious concerns 
over whether the Colombian state could respond to the insurgent threat. Even before the 
El Billar defeat, the United States Defense Intelligence Agency had determined that the 
prospects for the Colombian government were grim. As reported by The Washington 
Post, the analysis “concluded that Colombia's military, battling a Marxist insurgency 
financed by millions of dollars from the cocaine and heroin trade, could be defeated 
within five years unless the Bogota government regains political legitimacy and its armed 
forces are drastically restructured.”40 
                                                 
37 Camilo Echandía Castilla and Eduardo Bechara Gómez, “Conducta de la Guerrilla Durante el 
Gobierno Uribe Vélez: de las Lógicas de Control Territorial a las Lógicas de Control Estratégico” 
[Guerrilla Conduct during the Uribe Velez government: From the logic of territorial control to the logic of 
strategic control], Analisis Politico 19, no. 57 (August 2006), 48, http://www.scielo.org.co/scielo.php?pid= 
s0121-47052006000200002&script=sci_arttext; Renwick and Hanson, “FARC, ELN.”   
38 June S. Beittel, Peace Talks in Colombia (CRS Report No. R42982) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 3 April 2014), 4, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42982.pdf; Echandía and 
Bechara, “Conducta de la Guerrilla” [Guerrilla Conduct], 33; David Spencer, “Bogota Continues to Bleed 
as FARC Find their Military Feet,” Jane's Intelligence Review 10, no. 011 (1 November 1998), ProQuest 
(document ID: 198071637), http://search.proquest.com/docview/198071637?accountid=12702.  
39 Spencer, “Bogota Continues to Bleed.” Note: The FARC claimed 80 soldiers killed, 62 is the figure 
from the army. 
40 Douglas Farah, “Colombian Rebels Seen Winning War; U.S. Study Finds Army Inept, Ill-
Equipped,” Washington Post, 10 April 1998, A17, ProQuest (document ID: 408360675). 
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Though it was the most dangerous to the state, the FARC was by no means the 
only illegal armed group. The ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, or National 
Liberation Army in English) was another leftist insurgency-cum-criminal organization 
fighting against the state. The ELN was also founded in the 1960s in response to the 
exclusion of communists from the political sphere, however the group was, and continues 
to be, considerably smaller than the FARC. 41 The ELN reached its maximum strength in 
the 1990s, at around 5,000 members, with current estimates placing its fighters at fewer 
than 2,000.42 Though capable of deadly attacks in both urban and rural areas, the ELN 
has never had the power to credibly threaten the military or the state, leading some to 
view the group as “essentially a law and order concern.”43 
Paramilitaries represent another significant armed challenge for the Colombian 
state. Paramilitary forces have existed for a long time in Colombia, sometimes legally, 
sometimes illegally, owing to a lack of state presence and/or security in many locations 
throughout the national territory. Colombian paramilitaries in their most recent form grew 
out of government encouragement in the late 1960s for citizens to protect themselves and 
fight the leftist insurgencies. By 1989, the cooptation of the paramilitaries by wealthy 
landowners and narco-traffickers led to so much violence against ordinary citizens that 
the state outlawed the formation of new groups, and in 1993, the paramilitaries were 
officially recognized as a security threat. Nonetheless, some government and military 
interests continued to align with the paramilitaries, leading to an enduring link between 
the state and the paramilitaries even as the state officially worked to combat them.44 
Despite the significant challenges of the ELN and the paramilitaries, during the 
late 1990s the FARC represented the greatest direct threat to the Colombian state thanks 
to its large size, its considerable fighting ability, and its goal of carrying out a communist 
revolution. This was a real threat to the Colombian state. Not only was the FARC 
                                                 
41 Renwick, “Backgrounder.” 
42 Beittel, Peace Talks, 9. 
43 Marks, “A Model Counterinsurgency,” 50. 
44 Richani, “Caudillos,” 406–408; Robert D. Ramsey III, From El Billar to Operations Fenix and 
Jaque: The Colombian Security Force Experience, 1998–2008, Occasional Paper 34 (Fort Leavenworth, 
KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), 10. 
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winning battles against the military, as illustrated earlier, but it also controlled large 
amounts of territory. Some estimates put FARC-controlled territory in the late 1990s at 
nearly 50% of Colombia.45 The Colombian government’s own estimate claimed partial or 
full control over only 70% of the country.46 Other indicators, such as state presence, also 
speak to the precarious nature of the state: some observers estimated that 158 of 
Colombia’s 1,099 municipios (similar to U.S. counties) had no state presence at all in the 
late 1990s.47 Prior to 2002, 169 municipios specifically had no police presence.48 
The threat of the FARC and the other illegal armed groups to the state is relevant 
to citizen security because the state is unable to fulfill its duties to its citizens when it is 
forced from an area by armed groups. If the state were the source of insecurity and the 
armed groups actually protected the people, then the lack of state presence might be a 
boon, but this was not the case in Colombia. The Colombian government did commit 
abuses, but it was also the best source of protection for its citizens, and providing this 
protection required the removal of the illegal armed groups. Within the illegal armed 
groups, the threat that the paramilitaries posed to citizen security is not contentious, but 
the threat posed by the insurgent groups, especially the FARC, sometimes is. The next 
section thus focuses on the security issues surrounding the FARC. 
As Julia Sweig explains, the FARC’s income is generated “primarily through the 
coca and poppy industries and ancillary kidnapping, extortion, and assassination rackets; 
the ELN specializes in kidnapping and also regularly targets Colombia's other major 
resource, oil.”49 Combine the financing activities with human rights abuses carried out in 
pursuit of political or military goals and the insurgents create substantial insecurity. For 
instance, insurgents have been responsible for the majority of kidnappings in Colombia 
                                                 
45 Mark Peceny and Michael Durnan, “The FARC’s Best Friend: U.S. Antidrug Policies and the 
Deepening of Colombia’s Civil War in the 1990s,” Latin American Politics and Society 48, no. 2 (Summer 
2006): 95; Beittel, Peace Talks, 4. 
46 Ford, Drug Reduction Goals, 24. 
47 Beittel, Peace Talks, 4. 
48 Ford, Drug Reduction Goals, 45. 
49 Julia Sweig, “What Kind of War for Colombia?,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (2002): 123,  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20033273. It should be noted that according to Sweig, the AUC makes its 
money through the same security-damaging methods as the FARC. 
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over the last 35 years, with the FARC being the worst offender of the insurgent groups.50 
Insurgents were responsible for 24,482 kidnappings between 1970 and 2010, 62.7% of a 
total of 39,053 during that period.51 (Organized crime was the next worse group, with 
9,568 kidnappings, or 24.5% of the total; the paramilitaries hold third place with 2,541 
kidnappings, or 6.5% of the total, more than nine times fewer than the insurgents.52 
Organized crime refers to groups with purely financial motivations, as opposed to those 
with ideological or security motivations. This distinction is admittedly blurry on 
occasion.) 
The insurgent groups (as well as the paramilitaries) also commit serious human 
rights violations by heavily recruiting and using child soldiers.53 Human Rights Watch 
estimates that in 2003 20-30% of the FARC were children, and notes that if the urban 
militias are included this could mean that more than 7,400 children were fighting for the 
FARC in 2003.54 The proportion of children in the paramilitaries was lower, with Human 
Rights Watch estimating in 2003 that “no more than 20% of AUC forces, including its 
urban cadres, are under eighteen, or 2,200 individuals.”55 Children are not spared any 
duties thanks to their age and they are subjected to inhumane treatment, including being 
forced to take part in battles, assassinations, executions, and torture.56 It is not uncommon 
for children to be forced to carry out the execution sentences of other children, even of 
close friends.57 
                                                 
50 Grupo de Memoria Histórica, Informe General, ¡BASTA YA! Colombia: Memorias de Guerra y 
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52 Ibid. 
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54 Ibid., 24. 
55 Ibid., 28. 
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In addition to the violence of their financial and recruiting activities, the 
insurgents are also the main source of deaths caused by indiscriminate weapons.58 While 
the government has outlawed the use of antipersonnel mines and the paramilitaries do not 
use them often, the use of mines by the insurgents, especially the FARC, rose 
considerably during the 2000s.59 As Russell Crandall explains, “From 2000 to 2009, 
7,000 Colombians were killed or wounded by mines, most of which were planted by 
FARC; today, mines lie across roughly 60% of Colombia’s departments.”60 Human 
Rights Watch also points out that “in addition to using antipersonnel landmines, the 
FARC are notorious for their use of gas cylinder bombs.”61 These weapons are powerful 
but very difficult to aim and thus cause indiscriminant civilian casualties, which is a 
violation of international humanitarian law.62 Both the FARC and the ELN regularly use 
gas cylinder bombs, whereas the paramilitaries do not use them.63 
While the paramilitaries may not use indiscriminant weapons, they are still known 
for persecuting the civilian population. In contrast, as Human Rights Watch explains, the 
rules of the FARC require members to treat civilians well: “The FARC-EP prohibits 
unruly conduct by its fighters especially when they are among the civilian population. 
Robbery, extortion, threats, sexual abuse, and the irresponsible use of firearms can be 
capital offenses.”64 The insurgent groups are, in fact, considered to carry out fewer 
attacks directly against civilians, but the key distinction is “fewer.” The respectable 
exhortations of the insurgents’ rules do not provide much protection against insurgent 
abuses in reality. For example, in order to avoid looking soft when releasing hostages, in 
2009 the FARC adopted a strategy of launching terror attacks that coincide with the 
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59 Ibid., 6, 15. 
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62 Ibid., 12–13. 
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releases.65 As an illustration, Jim Rochlin points to a FARC bombing “of a Blockbuster 
video store in a crowded area of Bogotá that killed two and injured 20 just prior to the 
group’s release in early 2009 of six hostages.”66 The 2009 implementation of this 
strategy is reflected in the long-term data for terror attacks in Colombia related to the 
armed conflict. The data show a similar trend to the crime statistics covered later in this 
chapter: terror attacks increased sharply in the late 1990s, reaching a peak around 2002 
before falling off sharply in response to the government’s counterinsurgency offensive; 
the numbers then begin to rise again in 2009.67 Grupo de Memoria Histórica documents 
the attacks, showing “95 terror attacks in the armed conflict between 1988 and 2012, with 
a total of 223 people killed and 1,343 people injured. Of the 95 cases, 77 were 
perpetrated by guerrilla groups (principally the FARC, with 55, and the ELN, with 12), 
16 by unidentified armed groups, and two by the paramilitaries.”68 
While the terror attacks previously mentioned do not directly affect a large 
number of people, other actions by the insurgents do have a widespread direct effect. In a 
2001 publication discussing the FARC’s compliance with international humanitarian law, 
Human Rights Watch condemned the group for widespread violations of international 
humanitarian law, including the abduction and killing of civilians, use of indiscriminate 
weapons, hostage-taking (kidnapping), inhumane treatment of prisoners, recruitment of 
child soldiers, and attacks and threats against medical workers and facilities.69 These 
violations occurred not only in disputed regions but also in areas where the FARC are 
unchallenged, including in the demilitarized zone that was established as a safe area for 
the FARC as part of peace negotiations from 1998 to 2002 with the Pastrana government. 
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The Colombian government completely withdrew from this area with the agreement that 
the FARC would provide for the protection of citizens. While the FARC were in charge, 
thousands of people were forcibly displaced either by direct threats from the FARC or 
because they feared for the safety of themselves or their family.70  
Thirteen years after the FARC’s abuses in the demilitarized zone, Human Rights 
Watch released published an article detailing the abuses in another area dominated by the 
FARC, the city of Tumaco on the southern Pacific coast of Colombia. Although the 
FARC is by no means the only group to have committed human rights abuses in Tumaco 
(paramilitary successor groups and even the military are also mentioned in the report), the 
FARC has been a major contributor to the violence, and it has continued to inflict 
violence on the population even since winning the battle for territorial control against 
paramilitary successor groups in late 2013. The FARC offenses listed by in the report 
include “killings, disappearances, kidnapping, torture, forced displacement, attempted 
forced recruitment, planting landmines, extortion, and death threats against community 
leaders. Official data indicates the FARC has also committed sexual violence in Tumaco 
in 2013 and 2014.”71 José Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at Human Rights Watch, 
sums up the article: “FARC abuses are devastating Tumaco’s afro-Colombian 
communities. The FARC has a tight grip over the lives of many Tumaco residents, who 
are forced to keep silent as the guerrillas plant their fields with landmines, drive them 
from their homes, and kill their neighbors and loved ones with impunity.”72 The 
willingness of the insurgents to engage in human rights abuses against civilians on an 
ongoing basis over many years speaks to the lie in the insurgents’ regard for the well-
being of civilians and demonstrates some of the ways in which the groups harm citizen 
security. 
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C. THE MILITARY’S ROLE IN COMBATING INSECURITY 
Countering the insecurity created by the FARC and other illegal armed groups 
required the Colombian state to subdue these groups, a goal toward which the military 
has made significant progress. In the 1990s, the military began significant internal 
reforms aimed at making it an effective fighting force that could counter the insurgencies 
it faced.73 Though reforms were widespread, they “focused mainly on revitalizing the 
military education system, turning lessons learned into operational and organizational 
modifications, and developing sound NCO leadership to enhance small unit 
performance.”74 Plan Colombia, as initiated by President Pastrana and strengthened by 
President Uribe, significantly increased military spending and improved the combat 
capacity, training, and logistics of the Colombian armed forces.75 These efforts were 
facilitated in part by the United States (the role of which is dicussed later, particularly in 
Chapter IV), but more significantly by the Colombian people. In particular, President 
Uribe was able to pass a so-called war tax to help finance the military’s reforms and 
fighting activities. Aimed at wealthy Colombians and renewed in various forms 
throughout Uribe’s tenure and into that of President Santos, the tax brought in about $1 
billion a year for the government.76 Notable changes as a result of the Colombian (and 
U.S.) efforts include the large jump in military personnel and the extensive helicopter 
acquisitions. The armed forces increased in size by 68% between 1999 and 2007, with an 
even greater amount of growth (290%) in the number of professional soldiers (as opposed 
to conscripts, who made up the majority of the force).77 The helicopter inventory 
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increased from approximately 20 in 1998 to 265 in 2007 (counting military and police 
aircraft together), an increase which helped provide the security forces the mobility they 
needed to conduct both offensive and defensive operations against the insurgents.78 The 
reforms and added support from the civilian government paid off, and the military gained 
the initiative against the FARC by the mid-2000s.79 During these early years of Plan 
Colombia, the military succeeded in destroying the FARC’s ability to conduct large-scale 
attacks and forced it to give up its bid to gain territory, reducing the insurgency to 
fighting to hold onto specific strategic positions from which it could continue to make 
guerrilla-style attacks.80 It is true that being reduced to fighting to hold strategic positions 
is much different from being reduced to an inability to fight, but the gain for the 
government is nonetheless noteworthy. 
The military’s accomplishments are reflected in a variety of measurements. For a 
one-year snapshot, International Crisis Group notes that, “according to army sources, 
between 7 August 2002 and 29 July 2003 the armed forces and the police killed 1,211 
FARC, 379 ELN and 236 paramilitary fighters and captured 2,363 FARC, 556 ELN and 
1,202 paramilitaries. In addition, the army states that 1,099 FARC, 337 ELN and 258 
paramilitary fighters gave themselves up.”81 The Economist provides a similar snapshot, 
comparing the government’s success to that of its foes using figures from Fundación 
Seguridad y Democracia which show the security forces fighting 72% more battles in 
2003 than in 2002, while killing 2,980 members of the irregular armies, compared to 
losing 523 of its own.82 Looking at the multi-year effects, the number of FARC 
combatants dropped about 50% from an estimated peak of 16,000 to 20,000 in the early 
2000s to approximately 8,000 to 9,000 in 2012.83 More important is the amount of 
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territorial control that the military was able to establish. According to the Colombian 
MOD, by 2007 the state was in either partial or full control of 90% of Colombian 
territory, up from an estimated 70% in 2003.84 Looking at the other side of the coin 
(FARC presence), the shift was perhaps more dramatic. According to some sources, the 
FARC maintained a presence in almost 700 municipios in 1998, up from 173 a decade 
earlier.85 Writing in 2013 at the end of Plan Colombia, James A. Robinson notes that the 
military’s counterinsurgency of the 2000s pushed the FARC “out of half of the 
[municipios] in which it was present in 2002.”86 Furthermore, gains against the FARC 
allowed the government to establish a police presence in the 169 municipios previously 
lacking any state law enforcement, meaning all 1,099 municipios in the country had some 
form of police representation.87 The gains against the FARC were mirrored against the 
ELN, which has lost approximately 60% of its numbers since its peak in the 1990s.88 
D. IMPROVEMENTS IN CITIZEN SECURITY 
The gains against the insurgents and the increased control of the state over 
territory led to an improvement in citizen security. First, homicide rates have followed 
the intensity of conflict in Colombia, so although homicides rose around the year 2000 as 
the armed conflict intensified, as the military gained success and pushed the insurgents 
out of more and more areas, the homicide rates fell.89 Just in case this scenario comes 
across as a case of an organization fixing a problem it was responsible for creating, it is 
worth emphasizing that the FARC was the organization that was dedicated to violently 
overthrowing the democratically elected government and was consciously increasing the 
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violence in pursuit of that goal. Indeed the Pastrana government (1998–2002) had tried 
during most of its tenure to negotiate peace with the FARC.  
Second, as an organization that finances itself through drug trafficking, extortion, 
and kidnapping, one would expect that as the FARC experienced substantial loses in 
manpower, territory, and materiel, there would be some effect on its financing activities. 
A more detailed discussion of crime statistics follows, but the short answer is that we do 
see a significant drop in these crimes commensurate with the military’s counterinsurgent 
fight. 
Citizen security is not something that can be measured directly, but it is possible 
to gain a sense of it from examining a range of crime/security data. Choosing which data 
to examine is its own difficult task, especially in consideration of the military-specific 
nature of the question at hand. The number of homicides, burglaries, and vehicle thefts 
are considered a good proxy for measuring broader crime/security, so these issues are 
given emphasis here.90 Other issues also have direct relevance to insurgent activities, as 
well as to the protection of life and physical and material integrity, so those will be 
addressed also. 
Looking at crime statistics, we can see security improvement over the course of 
Plan Colombia, though it is a mixed picture, whether we look at the three “proxy” crimes 
or at a broader range of offenses such as kidnappings, sexual assaults, and terrorist acts. 
Nonetheless there is still a distinct positive trend to the security environment in Colombia 
that correlates strongly with the activities of the military. June Beittel of the 
Congressional Research Service gives the short description this way, “according to U.S. 
State Department figures, kidnappings in Colombia declined by 83%, homicides by 40%, 
and terrorist attacks by 76% between 2002 through 2008.”91 We are certainly interested 
in the homicide figure, as one of the noted proxies, but the dramatic decline in 
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kidnappings and terrorist attacks point to improved protection of life and physical 
integrity.  
Looking at the homicide numbers more closely, from 2002 to 2013 the number of 
homicides dropped steadily from 28,837 to 15,419. Only two years (2011 and 2012) saw 
an increase over the previous year, but this increase was slight and was succeeded by a 
new low in 2013. Despite the impressive downward trend, it’s worth noting that the 
murder rate per 100,000 inhabitants is still a staggering 32.7, meaning there is 
considerable work to be done to continue the good start that has been achieved.92 
To give some perspective to the homicide numbers just mentioned, the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reports that for 2012 the average homicide rate in 
South America was 16.1 murders per 100,000 inhabitants. Venezuela was the only South 
American country with a higher rate than Colombia, registering 53.7. At the other end of 
the spectrum, the murder rate in Chile was 3.1. Central America was noticeably more 
dangerous, having an average homicide rate of 34.3, with a minimum of 8.5 in Costa 
Rica and a staggering maximum of 90.4 in Honduras. Looking outside Latin America, the 
United States recorded 4.7 murders per 100,000 in 2012, while Western Europe averaged 
0.7.93 
Mass homicides (massacres) also decreased markedly during Plan Colombia. This 
is, however, a sort of mixed indicator because the massacre numbers are more closely 
associated with the paramilitaries than with the insurgents or military. The decrease in 
massacres is related to the Colombian military’s success, but indirectly so, since military 
success against the FARC meant the paramilitaries had less reason to continue their own 
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anti-leftist campaign of terror. Peter DeShazo, Tanya Primiani, and Phillip McLean give 
this explanation: “The number of massacres and persons killed in massacres (defined 
normally as 4 or more associated deaths) rose precipitously from 1997 to 2001, closely 
associated with increased paramilitary activity, and dropped just as dramatically after that 
year.”94 The downward trend continued for a while, but leveled out after 2007, and in 
2013 there were 104 massacre victims in Colombia.95 That is still a large number, but it’s 
down approximately 91% from the peak in 2000. 
After homicides, the next category for our security proxies, vehicle thefts, shows 
some interesting mixed results. Automobile thefts declined steadily from 17,303 thefts in 
2002 to 8,099 thefts in 2010, then made a small jump before settling back to 8,934 in 
2013. Although there are a couple of bumps, carjackings show an even more impressive 
decrease, starting at 1,436 in 2002, and sitting at 470 in 2013. Motorcycle thefts, 
disappointingly, show distinctly the opposite trend: after decreasing moderately from 
12,974 in 2002, thefts have increased considerably in the last seven years, with 23,200 
occurrences in 2013. Combining automobiles and motorcycles yields a small initial 
decrease followed by a noticeable upward movement. Of note, both individually and 
combined, the trends show improvement during the first few years of the military’s 
concerted counterinsurgency efforts, then the gains level off or reverse.96  
Considering the economic nature of vehicle thefts and the difficulties the 
Colombian government has had with following military success with civilian 
development, the trend reversal is perhaps not too surprising, though the dramatic nature 
of the motorcycle theft increase is intriguing and troubling. 
Looking at the last of the three proxies, burglary is the most negative. The 
progression is not smooth, but as expected, there is an initial decrease. The decrease is 
small though, and only lasts from 2003 to 2005. After that, there is a notable upward 
trend to burglaries, with a 32% overall increase between 2002 and 2013.97 Another crime 
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set that is not part of the proxies but that is closely related to burglary is personal thefts. 
These include both violent and non-violent acts such as purse-snatchings, pickpocketing, 
holdups, and muggings.98 Personal thefts also decrease a little from 2002 to 2004, 
following expectations and the trend of just about every other crime, but thereafter 
personal thefts go on a steady and steep rise such that the 2013 figure is 180% above 
2002’s.99  
As noted above, certain trends outside the general security proxies are also worth 
examining because they are meaningful for citizen security. Kidnappings are notable both 
for the relation to a person’s physical integrity and for the significance they have as a 
primary FARC activity. Kidnappings are also notable for their precipitous decrease 
following the success of the military. Kidnappings dropped from a total of 2,882 in 2002, 
to a low of 213 in 2009, then have held at about 300 per year after that, yielding 
approximately a 90% decrease.100  
Extortion, another FARC mainstay, actually rose somewhat from 2002 to 2004, 
but then dropped noticeably through 2008. Since 2008, extortion has risen, and from 
2012 to 2013 it more than doubled, which places the number at just over double the 2002 
figure.101  
Terrorist acts have followed a similar trend to extortion, creating a sort of “U” 
shape from 2002 to 2013 (as mentioned earlier in the section on civilian attacks), though 
thankfully the right side of the U is still about 46% lower than the 2002 high.102  
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Though not specifically related to the counterinsurgency, sexual assaults are very 
relevant to citizen security and they have, sadly, risen almost every year since 2003, 
starting at 3,225 and moving to 11,592 in 2013.103 Domestic violence exhibits a similar 
rise, more than doubling from 2005 to 2013.104  
Overall, the crime index as presented by the Colombian Ministry of Defense 
(which includes the crimes mentioned above as well as a few others, but excludes 
domestic violence and sexual offenses) is a disappointing “W” shape. (Note that the 
crime index is presented by the Ministry of Defense because the police in Colombia fall 
within the Ministry of Defense.) The years 2002 and 2003 show above average but 
decreasing crime; 2004–2010 move up and down, but show below average crime; and 
2011–2013 jump back up above average, with 2013 actually having a higher crime index 
than 2002.105 
The irregular W of the crime index provides a useful way to visualize the above 
statistics: following a peak of violence around 2000, corresponding roughly to the height 
of insurgent power and military/paramilitary/insurgent conflict, the policies of Plan 
Colombia, which were focused on the military, precipitated a dramatic drop in crime. All 
crime levels dropped from 2002–2004, except extortion (which fell after 2004) and 
sexual offenses and domestic violence, which have essentially only risen. Unfortunately, 
after considerable gains in the early- to mid-2000s, crime rates generally leveled off, or in 
some cases rose. The rise in the criminal index in recent years is driven mostly by 
terrorist acts, motorcycle thefts, personal thefts, and extortion. Motorcycle and personal 
thefts lie outside the purview of the military, even in the internal security role it fills in 
Colombia (the same is true of domestic violence and sexual offenses, the other 
skyrocketing crimes), but acts of terrorism and even extortion are within the military’s 
scope. Importantly, the stagnation and reversal of crime is an expected outcome when the 
state fails to consolidate its gains with civilian institutions, as is discussed later. 
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In addition to the crime rates just mentioned, citizen security is also threatened in 
other ways, with the forced displacement of citizens perhaps being the most prominent in 
Colombia. The cumulative number of Colombians who have been forced to flee their 
homes due to conflict over the past three decades is more than 5.5 million.106 Displaced 
persons have generally been seeking to escape the violence of conflict between the 
military, the insurgents, and the paramilitaries, but more recently, the criminal gangs who 
have moved in to fill the void left by the withdrawal of the other groups have become the 
main source of forced displacements.107 Maria Derks-Normandin indicates that, “forced 
displacement has also been linked to economic activities and associated land-grabbing, in 
particular for mining and resource extraction and mass scale oil palm cultivation and 
other agriculture activities.”108 Derks-Normandin also notes that an increase in 
displacements is to be expected during “military activities to combat guerrillas and end 
the conflict,”109 thus the long-term goal of ending one of the primary sources of 
displacements makes matters worse in the short term.110 This may account for the spike 
around 2001, as well as other portions of the displacement numbers; however, the more 
or less level nature of the annual displacement figures since the late 1990s indicates a 
large, continuing problem for citizen security. The observation, though, that the cause of 
displacement has now shifted away from military-type actions toward criminal activity 
lends credence to the idea that the military succeeded in its role within Plan Colombia 
(reducing the insurgent threat and open warfare that displaced citizens) but that the 
efforts of the government to solidify and consolidate the military gains have been lacking 
(allowing space for criminal elements to take over, which causes displacement). 
The enduring nature of forced displacement, as well as the recent increases in 
terrorism and extortion, point out that there are failures in Colombia’s security system. 
Furthermore, despite the often-plummeting crime rates of the early- to mid-2000s, even 
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the lowest rates never achieved an acceptable level of security. Nonetheless, the setbacks 
just described do not mean the military efforts at improving security were a failure. 
Military action was not intended to establish total peace; the military was expected to 
provide a secure space in which the rest of the government could operate so as to produce 
the economic and social security that draws people away from the criminality that harms 
citizen security.111 International Crisis Group explains the concept this way: “It is 
standard counter-insurgency doctrine that physical control of territory can be sustained 
only if military action is followed by the positive benefits of a broader state presence. The 
Colombian armed forces have increasingly been able to achieve the former; the Uribe 
administration’s 2007 security consolidation strategy recognized the necessity of the 
latter.”112 A major source of the continuing trouble in Colombia is the inability of the 
Colombian government to follow the military gains with effective social and economic 
development, even if the necessity to do so was recognized.113 
Social and economic development are part of the build phase of the familiar 
counterinsurgency strategy of clear, hold, and build.114 The broad-brush idea behind Plan 
Colombia was that the military would retake control of an area from the illegal armed 
groups (clear); once control was established, local military and police forces (campesino 
soldiers and carabineros) would provide security to the citizens (hold); and this would 
allow the state to reestablish and deliver public institutions and services (build).115 The 
clear part was reasonably successful, the hold and build portions have been less so. 
Although the military was able to successfully gain control of much territory, the 
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Colombian state had considerable difficulty stabilizing and developing these areas. 
Frequently the inhabitants did not trust the government, did not trust that the government 
would remain, or the government could not get non-security organizations to send people 
to the newly controlled areas because the prospective employees feared for their own 
security.116 Lamenting this trend, the United States Agency for International 
Development offered this critique: “The civilian follow-up to military clearing and 
holding operations is frequently slow, uncoordinated, lacking resources, and suffers from 
a lack of commitment and ownership at the highest levels of the Colombian 
government.”117 The lack of an effective build phase is a severe problem for the country 
in almost all regards, and it is certainly a great detriment to security. As mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, an important part of full citizen security is the development of a 
government and citizenry that are encouraged to, as well as capable of, foregoing 
violence and crime in pursuit of their goals and needs.118 
E. CONCLUSION 
The absence of widespread and successful state or institution building following 
the military’s clearing and holding efforts is a negative element for citizen security, but 
the absence does not affect the lessons to be learned about the military’s effects on citizen 
security. Long plagued by conflict, in the late 1990s, Colombia found itself facing 
skyrocketing violence and crime, as a well several strong illegal armed groups, including 
insurgencies and paramilitaries. Among these, the strongest was the FARC, an insurgent 
group that aimed to violently overthrow the state and that was gaining the military 
capacity to do so. These groups created considerable insecurity for Colombians through a 
wide range of actions from assassination to kidnapping to extortion to indiscriminate 
attacks on civilian targets. Improving security required the state to both degrade the 
ability of the illegal armed groups to carry out their crimes, and to re-establish its own 
presence throughout the country in order to provide continuing security and development 
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services. Improved funding, equipment, and manpower for the military, as well as 
reforms in training and operations allowed the Colombian military to significantly 
weaken the FARC and other illegal armed groups, and to regain large amounts of 
territory for the state, thus leading to an improvement in citizen security. 
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III. CRITIQUES OF THE ARGUMENT THAT THE MILITARY 
IMPROVED CITIZEN SECURITY 
While many scholars agree with the conclusion that the Colombian military aided 
citizen security during Plan Colombia, many others do not. This chapter addresses some 
of these critiques. We begin by addressing a structural critique of my argument, namely 
that the national-level data used is not sufficient to establish a causal link between 
military actions and improved security. We then address the two main critiques of Plan 
Colombia’s military actions. The first is that the military committed its own human rights 
abuses and therefore actually diminished citizen security rather than aiding it. The second 
is that Plan Colombia helped elite interests while harming rural and poor Colombians. 
These critiques are not baseless; it is true that there were problems associated directly 
with the military and Plan Colombia. That said, the value of the achievements and the 
overall balance of effects show that the military provided a useful, and even necessary, 
first step toward improving citizen security. 
A. LOCAL VERSUS NATIONAL DATA 
The concept of clear, hold, and build with which the last chapter ended suggests a 
twist on the way the security data just examined should be viewed: if the military, whose 
main job was to clear areas and secondarily to help hold them, contributed to improved 
citizen security in Colombia, one would expect that areas that were successfully cleared 
would experience a differential effect on crime when compared to areas that the military 
was unable to clear or areas that lacked the criminal groups to begin with. In other words, 
the national-level data just discussed should be disaggregated to the local level in order to 
truly draw a causal connection between the actions of the military and changes in citizen 
security. Knowing that the military had success in clearing some areas of the country and 
that the country as a whole experienced a decrease in crime concurrent with the clearing 
actions and consistent with the goals of the actions, still leaves open many alternate 
explanations for why violence and crime may have decreased. For instance, one could 
question whether the improvement was due to a change in the economy or the police 
force or the government. The best course of action would be to collect local-level data for 
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the crime statistics (e.g. at the municipio level), as well as local-level data on where the 
military operated and how much control, if any, it gained in those areas. The two datasets 
could then be evaluated against each other, and hopefully isolated from any exogenous 
factors, to determine any causal connection between the military’s success and the drop 
in crime. 
Unfortunately, finding the datasets to do this sort of rigorous evaluation, or 
finding other studies that have done similar comparisons, is difficult. In terms of data 
there are several good sources on conflict and non-conflict killings in Colombia, 
disaggregated by location (including Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos 
[CERAC], Centro de Investigación y Educación Popular—Programa por la Paz 
[CINEP/PPP], and Colombia’s National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic 
Science.)119 Unfortunately, finding similarly detailed data on other crimes, or on the 
changing geography of government control of territory, is much more difficult.120 
In terms of existing studies, the causal sources of the drop in crime and the causal 
effects of the military efforts are understudied. As Javier Pérez confirms, “Although there 
are, in fact, a large number of studies on crime in Colombia, rather less research has been 
done on the causal effects of crime control policies.”121 Many authors do mention the 
decreased crime in Colombia with reference to the government efforts to retake control of 
national territory, but causal connections are rarely made. Furthermore, the reference is 
generally only meant as part of the background to the topic actually being studied. 
Occasionally, a causal connection is asserted, but these claims are based on the same 
national level data I use in this thesis, and they are typically made in products whose 
source, such as the U.S. government, can be assumed to be biased toward viewing Plan 
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Colombia in a positive light. USAID provides a typical example, declaring, “Plan 
Colombia has achieved significant advances. Its greatest accomplishment has been the 
dramatic improvements in security in the country and the suppression of illegally armed 
groups, including the FARC, ELN, and paramilitary groups.”122  
Most authors do not claim a causal connection, but many—even those who seem 
to take a negative view of Plan Colombia—imply the connection. Ana M. Arjona 
illustrates this problem with the data as she provides background for her work exploring 
how violence and social order in Colombia affect each other: “Alvaro Uribe won the 
presidential elections in 2002 with a proposal to crush the guerrillas by military means. 
From 2002 on, the country saw a steady recovery of areas that were under guerrilla 
control, and violence decreased by most counts while concerns about human rights 
abuses by the state also increased.”123 Samir Elhawary provides another illustration: 
“Plan Colombia and the ‘democratic security’ policy succeeded in enhancing the security 
of the state vis-à-vis the threat of insurgency and reached a negotiated settlement for the 
demobilization of the paramilitaries. This led to a reduction in violence, but this has been 
limited spatially to the main urban and economic centers of the country, and has been 
discriminatory in its focus.”124 Elhawary’s article is arguing that Colombian efforts at 
stabilization “have privileged the security of the state and its allies at the expense of the 
effective protection of the civilian population,”125 but he still implies that the overall 
effect of Plan Colombia was a positive reduction in violence. 
The lack of established causal connections is not for a lack of research on 
Colombia, but rather a result of the emphasis of most of that research. Colombian society 
and politics have both suffered from extensive insecurity for decades, if not centuries. 
The conflict there has generated some very extensive and detailed studies, but the 
particular question that this thesis explores is not well addressed. For instance, a team led 
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by Stathis N. Kalyvas out of Yale University (which includes Arjona) has produced a 
great amount of local-level data related to the conflict, but their data is not of much use 
for studying the effects of the military on citizen security during Plan Colombia. Their 
work is focused on creating theoretical constructs to explain how civil war violence and 
individuals affect each other, and the data does not allow for the evaluation of military 
actions with regards to changes in crime. A case in point is Arjona’s dissertation on 
violence and social order noted above. She collects and analyzes considerable local-level 
data on violence, but it is not useful here because it is not correlated with where the 
military met with success or failure, nor does it address crime in the terms of this thesis, 
nor does it even mention Plan Colombia. 
In another example of detailed conflict research that does not answer the question 
of local-level effects, Jorge Restrepo and Michael Spagat make use of the CINEP 
database to examine the effects of Plan Colombia under President Uribe, and they 
conclude that “it is possible to measure what is going on in terms of violent attacks, 
armed clashes and both civilian and combatant deaths and injuries. Such metrics, 
analyzed rigorously, show incomplete but nonetheless unmistakable evidence that the 
Uribe government has had significant success in fighting the guerrillas while reducing 
civilian deaths.”126 Despite the detailed data, Restrepo and Spagat only analyze trends at 
the national level. They justify this partly by explaining that although “conflict conditions 
vary considerably by location, our findings are very strong, so the national trends we 
identify should generally reflect those of most regions.”127 
Javier Pérez has published two papers that perhaps get the closest to putting all 
the pieces together to determine the links between Plan Colombia and citizen security, 
but he is not directly focused on the military, and worse, his methodology is 
unconvincing. In “Plan Colombia’s Onset: Effects on Homicides and Violent Deaths,” 
Pérez analyzes the effects of Plan Colombia from 1999–2001 on homicides and other 
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types of violent deaths.128 The other paper, “Goals Met or Just Empty Promises? First 
Version of the Democratic Security Policy in Colombia,” analyzes the effects of Plan 
Colombia from 2002–2006 (specifically President Uribe’s Democratic Security Plan) on 
crime generally in Colombia. In the first paper, Pérez observes that the main focus of 
Plan Colombia during the early years was the eradication of coca. He therefore seeks “to 
analyze the causation between reducing coca cultivation and violent deaths,” a 
connection that might arise thanks to the increased economic and military resources 
dedicated to the eradication project.129 His analysis is centered on the differences in 
homicide rates in regions where a high percentage of coca crops were destroyed versus in 
regions where a low percentage of crops were destroyed (measured in hectares of coca 
plants, not in amount of coca produced).130 Since the eradication efforts were led by the 
military, this study has the potential to reveal a link between military efforts and changes 
in homicide rates (Pérez does not address other types of crime in which this thesis is 
interested, but the homicide connection would be a start). Unfortunately, Pérez does not 
explain very well why coca plant destruction should affect homicide rates, especially 
considering his observations that (1) the intent of Plan Colombia’s coca eradication was 
not dealing with crime; and that (2) although the number of hectares of coca plants 
decreased, “cocaine producers were able to produce virtually the same amount of coca 
leaf, and the corresponding amount in cocaine production even with only half of the land 
they had originally had.”131  
The apparently weak link between the independent and dependent variables in 
this study seems to be borne out by the results of Pérez’s analysis, which find no 
significant effect on the reduction of homicides overall, but a reduction in homicides for 
rural men and an increase for urban women.132 Although a reduction in homicides for 
rural men as a result of coca eradication might make sense due to the presence of extra 
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government forces in rural areas, the link between eradication (which took place in rural 
areas) and an increase in urban homicides of women only does not make sense. Without 
further explanation of the link between eradication and homicides, it is hard to trust that 
the results are not being affected by some hidden variable. 
The other paper by Pérez similarly suffers from questions concerning the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables. In “Goals Met or Empty 
Promises” Pérez asserts that rates dropped across a range of crimes in Colombia due to 
increased efforts at fighting illegal armed groups financially.133 New government efforts 
starting in 2002 were aimed at fighting the illegal armed groups by seizing their financial 
assets. The seizures were intended to weaken the ability of the groups to fight, as well as 
to provide additional funds to the government to compensate victims and society.134 
Pérez examines a range of crimes and finds that Plan Colombia had a substantial effect 
on crime in rural areas, where the illegal armed groups where concentrated, but crime in 
urban areas was not significantly reduced, since government efforts did not address 
common criminals.135 Pérez’s paper is one of the few that attempts to address the wide 
range of crimes that affect citizen security, and his theory that the legislative/financial 
fight had an impact on security is worth consideration (as is the assertion that reductions 
in crime benefitted rural areas more), but the idea that the only significant change that 
affected the government’s fight against illegal armed groups was the increased seizure of 
financial assets opposes most of the existing literature. Most authors observe an 
important change in the military actions of the Colombian government and point to the 
military changes as the source of changing crime rates. Disagreement with prevailing 
theories does not suggest error, but it does require a thorough explanation. This 
explanation is lacking in “Goals Met or Just Empty Promises?” and so once again the 
results are difficult to accept. Thus, although Pérez does attempt to establish the causal 
sources for changes in crime during Plan Colombia, and to do so with detailed, local-
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level data, the answers are unsatisfactory and this thesis is left continuing to rely on 
national trends. 
B. SOME SECURITY LOSSES DURING PLAN COLOMBIA 
The security trends described in the previous chapter showed the important gains 
in security resulting achieved by the military, but there have also been some distinct 
setbacks to citizen security related specifically to the military’s actions. In particular, the 
military has been associated with human rights abuses and collusion with the 
paramilitaries.136 Such actions counter the gains made in other areas and must be 
weighed in the balance to determine the overall impact of the military on citizen security. 
The negative actions of the military can be examined in two ways. First, crimes 
committed by the military add to the crime rates of the country instead of reducing them 
(straightforward conceptually if not empirically). Second, the effect of military crimes on 
the legitimacy of both the military and the government must be considered, because a 
loss of legitimacy detracts from the government’s ability to provide security, as well as 
other services.  
Possibly the most egregious abuse by the military during Plan Colombia was the 
practice of intentionally killing civilians and then dressing them up to look like insurgents 
so that they could be counted as enemy killed. This practice, known as “false positives,” 
has a long history in Colombia, but the largest number of violations occurred from 2004 
to 2008.137 The estimates of the number of civilians murdered vary widely. In his report 
on Colombia, Philip Alston, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or 
Arbitrary Executions, notes a low estimate of 995 murders (between July 2002 and June 
2007) and a high estimate of 1,486 (between July 2002 and June 2008).138 Other groups 
provide still higher estimates, though all seem to agree that the task of estimating the 
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number of civilians killed illegally by the military is difficult owing to questions of how 
incidents are reported and how they are tracked and counted.  
To see the direct effect of the false positives on security, we use the numbers from 
the Colombian Commission of Jurists (which estimates 1,902 civilians illegally killed 
between July 2002 and June 2008) and add these false positive numbers to the number of 
homicides (by year). Doing so does not change the steep downward trend of the homicide 
rate already discussed.139 Even during the worst year, 2007, with an estimated 519 false 
positives, the added deaths only increase the murder rate by 1.2/100,000 inhabitants 
(from 39.2 to 40.4/100,000).140 So from the numerical perspective (callous though it may 
be), the false positive activities of the military did not outweigh the benefits of the 
military success concerning citizen security.  
The more difficult, and important, aspect to measure is the impact of the murders 
on the legitimacy of the military. The effect of the actions on the military’s legitimacy is 
so important because the military cannot fulfill its job of protecting the population and 
defeating the insurgency if it is perceived as illegitimate. The population will not support 
an illegitimate military with indirect assistance (such as taxes) or direct assistance (such 
as intelligence). Furthermore, if the population perceives the military as illegitimate, they 
are more likely to support the insurgency. A loss of legitimacy is also significant because 
legitimacy in this context is based on trust, and trust is difficult to build. Ending the 
practice of false positives is relatively quick and easy compared to the long road of 
rebuilding trust with the community.  
Measuring the impact of the false positives on the military’s legitimacy should be 
addressed both in terms of loss of support for the military and increase in support for the 
non-state actors vying for social control. Surprisingly, the revelations of the practice of 
false positives only affected public opinion of the military slightly, decreasing its 
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approval rating from 79% to 77%.141 This level of support is still quite high and does not 
indicate a lack of legitimacy that would prevent the military from fulfilling its proper role 
as a protector of the nation.  
Just as the military did not lose legitimacy, the FARC did not gain any. The 
approval rating of the FARC has fluctuated between 1 and 5% since 2000 (with an 
average of roughly 2.5%), with the highest ratings coming at a three points in 2005 and 
2006. In late 2008, when the false positive scandal broke, the FARC’s approval rating 
actually decreased, from a 3% favorable public opinion in August down to a 1% 
favorable opinion in December. Essentially the FARC has never had any significant 
legitimacy and the violations of the military did not change this.142 
These points are not meant to support or condone the murders committed by the 
military, which are all the more abhorrent for being committed by an institution whose 
reason for being is to protect the very citizens it victimized. The intent is only to show 
that for the nation as a whole the detriments to security caused by the military did not 
outweigh the improvements. 
One last consideration when evaluating the changes in levels of security (and the 
actions or institutions that created those changes) is that not all crimes should be 
weighted equally. There is no single, absolute measure of seriousness for crimes, but 
societies across the world do attribute differing levels of severity to different crimes and 
there is remarkable cross-cultural consistency in the relative rankings of the most serious 
crimes.143 Marvin Wolfgang et al. also observe that, “implicit judgments about the 
severity of crime are imbedded in our social institutions,” meaning, for instance, that our 
laws are set up in such a manner as to explicitly rank certain crimes as worse than 
                                                 
141 Adriaan Alsema, “Support for Colombia Military and Police Sinks after Series of Scandals,” 
News, Colombia Reports, 6 March 2014, http://colombiareports.co/support-colombia-military-plummets-
series-scandals/.  
142 Gallup Colombia, “Gallup Poll, # 99, Colombia, Febrero 2014” (Document No. C 0526-
050021100), Gallup Colombia Ltda., http://colombiareports.co/support-colombia-military-plummets-
series-scandals/.  
143 Stelios Stylianou, “Measuring Crime Seriousness Perceptions: What Have We Learned and What 
Else do We Want to Know,” Journal of Criminal Justice 31 (2003), 45. 
 42 
others.144 Throughout the literature on the seriousness of criminal acts, the most serious 
ratings are given to crimes that cause bodily injury, followed next by those that cause 
property loss or damage (matching with our definition of citizen security as the protection 
of life and of people’s physical and material integrity.)145 In the case of this thesis, which 
is evaluating the military, greater importance should also be given to those crimes over 
which military actions are most likely to have an effect. Based on these considerations, 
the most serious indicators for security under consideration would be murder, 
kidnapping, extortion, and theft, in that order. Based on this criteria, even though 
extortion and theft have risen overall since the start of Plan Colombia, the precipitous 
decline of the more important murder and kidnapping numbers leads to the conclusion 
that the military’s participation in Plan Colombia aided security. 
C. PLAN COLOMBIA AS A TOOL OF THE ELITE 
In addition to the idea that certain military actions offset some of the security 
gains obtained, another critique of Plan Colombia is that the actions of the state helped 
elite interests while harming certain other groups, especially rural residents and the poor. 
Critics point to the enduring high level of income distribution inequality, the 
disproportionate effects of displacement on indigenous and afro-Colombian groups, and 
the economic benefit that certain groups have derived from the displacement of others.146 
The statistics do show these problems to be quite large. Colombia has the tenth most 
unequal income distribution in the world, as measured by the Gini index.147 Land 
distribution is also highly unequal: 1.15% of the Colombian population owns 52.2% of 
the land.148 Indigenous groups and afro-Colombians are indeed disproportionately 
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affected by displacement: indigenous people and afro-Colombians account for 13.4% of 
the national population, but they made up 44% of new internally displaced persons in 
2012.149 The displacement numbers themselves are tremendously high, with hundreds of 
thousands of newly displaced persons each year, and the total number of displacements 
since 1985 reaching close to six million.150 
The problem with the above critique is two-fold. First, the disproportionate harm 
done to the poor in Colombia is not an outgrowth of Plan Colombia; it is an outgrowth of 
the larger Colombian conflict, as well as a host of other historical conditions. As Michael 
Chernick pointed out shortly after the start of Plan Colombia, “Colombia’s tortured 
descent into lawlessness was the direct result of more than fifty years of internal armed 
conflict.”151 Even the long-standing conflict itself was the result of enduring problems. 
Virginia Bouvier explains that the FARC “was one of many Latin American guerrilla 
groups that emerged in the 1960s in response to widespread poverty and tremendous 
economic and social inequity.152 The second problem with the critique is that Plan 
Colombia, the strategy, should not be equated with the corrupt, illegal, and/or immoral 
acts of those involved in implementing or following the strategy. To address the first 
issue, it is useful to look at the long-term context of Plan Colombia, starting before its 
implementation and extending through to the current day. Plan Colombia was announced 
in September 1999 by President Pastrana.153 Forced displacement was a huge problem 
well before 1999; 809,000 Colombians were forcibly displaced from 1985 through 
                                                 
149 Derks-Normandin, Building Peace, 10. 
150 Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, “Numero de Personas Desplazadas a 
Nivel Nacional y Año de Llegada” [Number of persons displaced nationwide by year], Estadísticas 
Históricas De Desplazamiento, Consultoría para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento, 
http://www.codhes.org/index.php?option=com_si&type=1.  
151 Marc W. Chernick, “Colombia: Does Injustice Cause Violence?,” in What Justice? Whose Justice? 
Fighting for Fairness in Latin America, ed. Susan Eva Eckstein and Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 185. 
152 Virginia Bouvier, “Land, Conflict, and Peace in Colombia: An Interview with USIP’s Virginia 
Bouvier,” United States Institute for Peace, 10 April 2013, http://www.usip.org/publications/land-conflict-
and-peace-in-colombia.  
153 DeShazo, Primiani, and McLean, Back from the Brink, 9; Beittel, Peace Talks, 4. 
 44 
1995.154 From 1996 through 1998, the yearly figure of displaced persons jumped 
dramatically, reaching 308,000 in 1998 (the year before Plan Colombia was 
announced).155 The number of newly displaced persons has remained persistently high 
since that time, with an average from 1999 through 2012 of 296,594 people displaced 
each year, though there has been a downward trend since 2008.156  
Likewise, Colombia has long been a highly unequal country. Data on Colombia’s 
Gini index is spotty before 1999, but both the World Bank and the United Nation’s 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean agree that it fluctuated in 
the .5–.6 range between 1980 and 1999, and that the same trend has continued since. 
Importantly, both also agree that the Gini has been improving since 1999, if slowly. Even 
more significantly, the disaggregated numbers of the UN show that the Gini for rural 
Colombians has been falling faster and more steadily than for the nation as a whole.157 
Violence, too, was an extreme problem before Plan Colombia was put into place. 
The United Nations Statistics Division shows that from 1995 to 1999, the homicide rate 
was between 60.1 and 71.8 per 100,000 inhabitants. From 1999 to 2002, the homicide 
rate grew to 70.2, but then as described in the section on crime, the homicide rate began a 
rapid and steady decline.158  
Looking more specifically at the rural areas and populations that Plan Colombia 
critics cite, several authors provide good context for the situation. In an article entitled, 
“Political Violence and Farm Household Efficiency in Colombia,” María González and 
Rigoberto Lopez observe, “Production costs increase because of guerrilla or paramilitary 
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“taxes,” extortion, and kidnapping for self-financing and for rent- seeking purposes. … In 
addition, land prices have also been distorted by the acquisition of significant amounts of 
farmland by drug traffickers for investment and money laundering, rendering such prices 
less correlated with returns on investment in violent areas.”159 Joshua Angrist and 
Adriana Kugler address a similar vein when they write that, “rural areas that saw 
accelerated coca production subsequently became considerably more violent, while urban 
areas were affected little. These findings are consistent with the view that the Colombian 
civil conflict is fueled by the financial opportunities that coca provides and that rent-
seeking by combatants limits the economic gains from coca.”160 What makes the 
observations of these two articles so relevant here is that both are specifically describing 
the period just before Plan Colombia. 
The years prior to Plan Colombia were full of violence, murder, and displacement 
as guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, and the state fought a drug-fueled war for control and 
survival. Plan Colombia did not bring violence to the rural areas, disadvantaged groups, 
or the country; the violence was already there. When the government put Plan Colombia 
in place in an effort to reduce the violence, it worked. This was not only true for the 
country as a whole, as explained in the section on crime, it was true for Colombia’s 
vulnerable groups as well, the number of whom were murdered each year fell along with 
the national trend (though, as with the nation broadly, the rate is still much higher than it 
should be).161 
Furthermore, many measurements show that the social situation of the population 
has been improving in Colombia since the beginning of Plan Colombia (though, as with 
the Gini index, progress is slow). Unemployment is down from 17.3% in 2000 to 10.1% 
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in 2014.162 Spending has grown on both education and health, as a percentage of GDP 
and in real terms.163 Potable water, electricity, sanitation facilities, and sewage systems 
are more widely available, with the biggest gains occurring in rural areas.164 Rates of 
both extreme poverty and poverty have fallen since 2002, not only at the national, 
metropolitan, and urban levels, but at the rural level as well.165 Similarly, the depths of 
extreme poverty and poverty, measured by the poverty gap coefficient, have both 
fallen.166  
Despite all these positives, it is true that there are a few negative indicators. For 
the general population, the enrollment rate in primary education decreased from 2000-
2012 (though enrollment rates in pre-primary, secondary, and tertiary education all went 
up), and the availability of piped water at the home (as distinct from availability of 
improved drinking water) decreased slightly.167 For women specifically, although 
representation in the national parliament has grown, the economic situation has worsened 
in comparison to men: the wage ratio has fallen, except for those with 13 years or more of 
school (where the ratio has improved), the proportion of women in wage employment has 
fallen slightly, and the ratio of female-to-male poverty has grown (the number of women 
in poverty has decreased, but the number of men in poverty has decreased faster).168  
The foregoing arguments are not meant to imply that the conflict surrounding 
Plan Colombia has not been brutal, or even that the conflict has not harmed certain 
groups more than others (for this is a surety in almost any armed conflict), the point is 
that Plan Colombia was a response to the brutality that was ongoing in Colombia, not the 
source of the brutality. The execution of Plan Colombia was far from perfect. As 
discussed previously, the military itself had a hand in a portion of the abuses against the 
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civilian population. Additionally, the plan largely failed to bring about the significant 
social and political changes that will be required for long-term peace (though some of 
these changes may be in the works as part of the present, on-going peace talks between 
the government and the FARC). Nonetheless, Plan Colombia did achieve substantial 
success in dramatically improving the security situation and weakening the FARC 
sufficiently to bring it to the negotiating table. Further, these improvements have brought 
a modicum of social and economic success to people all across Colombia, rather than just 
to the elite, as the statistics above show. 
Besides rebutting the notion that Plan Colombia was a source of insecurity for 
particular sectors, it is important to separate the plan from the actions of those who 
executed it. Just as in peaceful countries, we evaluate the laws separately from the actions 
of the politicians, police force, and judicial system, so should we evaluate Plan Colombia 
as separate from the actions of Colombian’s politicians, security forces members, and 
judiciary members. As the Government Accountability Office points out, the goals of 
Pastrana’s plan were to “(1) reduce the flow of illicit narcotics and improve security; (2) 
promote social and economic justice; and (3) promote the rule of law.”169 The pillars of 
Uribe’s version, as described by Alejo Vargas Velásquez, were “(a) the protection of the 
rights of all citizens; (b) the protection of democratic values, pluralism and democratic 
institutions; and (c) the solidarity and cooperation of the entire community.”170 The abuse 
and murder of citizens, the theft of land, the collusion with paramilitary groups, were all 
illegal and counter to the strategy and goals of Plan Colombia. These trespasses are not 
reasons to condemn the strategy, rather like the actions of a police officer who also works 
for the mob is not a reason for condemning the city’s crime fighting strategy. 
To criticize Plan Colombia properly on the grounds that it harmed certain groups 
more than others would require demonstrating that the nature of the plan encouraged that 
harm, and that it encouraged harm beyond what a better constructed plan would have 
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done (for as mentioned previously, armed conflict by its nature tends to cause 
disproportionate harm to the various groups involved). Plan Colombia definitely failed to 
achieve some of its goals, and one might criticize it on these grounds, but it was not a 
plan designed to injure any (legitimate) sectors of society, nor was injury of any one 
legitimate group a foregone conclusion of the plan. 
Getting the distinction correct, the failure of the strategy versus the failure of the 
people or institutions, is important because it directly affects the lessons that should be 
learned from Colombia’s situation and whether Plan Colombia provides a useful model. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The security picture in Colombia, and the military’s effect on security, is a 
complicated and fluctuating one: there have been security gains in some areas, but 
setbacks in others, and the dramatic gains of the early 2000s have been offset somewhat 
by losses over the last several years. In spite of this, there is a good case for the positive 
role of the military in the pursuit of citizen security during Plan Colombia. The military’s 
successes against the insurgency precipitated a significant decline in some of the most 
egregious crimes (such as murder, massacre, and kidnapping), and the successes provided 
the environment in which the rest of the state could do its share. (Whether the rest of the 
state performed does not reflect on the military.) The military may not have completely 
defeated the insurgencies, nor did it take back all of the ungoverned territory, but it made 
impressive gains (especially considering the conditions under which it started in the 
1990s), and it allowed Colombia to move from a place where, as Robinson put it, “panic 
was setting in” among citizens at the idea that the FARC would win and the Colombian 
state would fail, to a place where Forbes lists it as one of “the ten coolest places to visit in 
2015.”171 There is much to be done, and much that could have been done better, but the 
net change is nonetheless quite positive. 
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IV. U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT AND COLOMBIA AS A 
SOURCE OF LESSONS FOR OTHER STATES 
A. BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY 
Building partner capacity is conceptually straight forward: it means increasing a 
partner nation’s ability to execute a particular task or mission by giving the partner some 
part of the training, materiel, advice, education, etc. that the U.S. military gives itself (i.e., 
it means applying the components of building U.S. capacity to partner nations). The term 
“building partner capacity” is very broad and is independent of the type of capacity, the 
amount of capacity, or the type of partner. It applies similarly to a small military with 
minimal capacity that needs considerable help, as to a large military with significant 
capacity that perhaps only needs assistance in some very specific skill. Although 
conceptually straightforward, in practice building partner capacity can be challenging 
because resource constraints and political or cultural barriers can impede the ability of the 
United States to provide the capacity.172 
Despite the challenges of implementation, building partner capacity has an 
established history in the U.S. military and continues to generate interest thanks to the 
idea that such actions provide the potential for relatively high-reward with relatively low 
risk. The military segment of U.S. government efforts to build capacity in a partner 
nation is generally a small portion of the overall effort, with other areas such as the 
economy and civilian government composing a significant share. Nonetheless, military 
training and advising are frequently used, and used with the expectation of a high rate of 
return, making such efforts worthy of study.  
U.S. special operations forces have long participated in capacity-building 
operations, and the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is 
specifically tasked with conducting capacity-building operations (though conventional 
forces are frequently involved as well). As Moyar, Pagan, and Griego point out, 
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“USSOCOM Publication 1 calls upon special operations forces to train, advise, and assist 
partner institutions in order to build their capacity, which in turn will reduce U.S. 
visibility, risk, and cost.”173 The potential to commit a relatively small amount of U.S. 
resources in a foreign nation such that the partner forces will be empowered to create 
security for themselves, while achieving a U.S. strategic goal in the process, is an 
attractive proposition, and it is a proposition that may be increasing in attractiveness 
thanks to the apparent war-weariness of the U.S. populace. However, even a relatively 
small commitment of resources is a waste if it is not capable of achieving its goals. 
Whether or not U.S. military training can actually improve the capacity of partner nations 
to ensure the security of their own citizens is not a resolved question. A survey of articles 
on the topic reveals considerable support for the idea that U.S. military training is 
beneficial (though not effective in isolation), but there is reasonable evidence to the 
contrary, and an overall lack of empirical data either way.  
One of the arguments against the utility of U.S. training can be found in an article 
by Thomas Bruneau titled “Challenges in Building Partner Capacity: Civil-Military 
Relations in the United States and New Democracies.” Bruneau argues that the United 
States currently lacks a national strategy, as demonstrated by the poor results of the wars 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that the lack of a strategy impedes the United States’ ability 
to build partner capacity.174 It is true that just as the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan 
suffered from a lack of strategy, so too will attempts to build partner capacity. But it is 
not that building capacity is difficult without a strategy (unless the lack of strategy creates 
a constantly shifting set of resources or goals), the problem is that there is no solid basis 
for determining which capacities to build in which partners. It is an extension of the same 
problem that the U.S. military has for itself: how can the military effectively allocate 
resources to train, equip, and prepare itself for current or future engagements if it lacks a 
guiding strategy? The lack of strategy does not mean that the U.S. military is no longer 
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able to create, for example, new fighter pilots, what it means is that the military is just 
guessing as to what skills or planes the pilots should have, or even as to whether it needs 
the pilots at all. 
We agree with Bruneau that the lack of strategy creates problems for the United 
States; however, I disagree that these problems have any special bearing on the concept 
of building partner capacity. The lack of strategy creates problems for almost any military 
endeavor. Whether the United States is trying to achieve some goal by taking direct 
military action itself, or it is trying to achieve the goal by gaining the assistance of a 
partner nation after helping that partner develop the ability to obtain the goal, the 
problems resulting from a lack of strategy are the same. 
The relevance of strategy to building partner capacity is in the distinction between 
grand strategy and strategy. Bruneau’s argument (and my response) is focused on grand 
strategy, which Peter Feaver defines as “the collection of plans and policies that comprise 
the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and economic tools 
together to advance that state’s national interest.”175 Strategy at the more basic level is 
defined as “a plan of action or policy designed to achieve a major or overall aim.”176 
Grand strategy is the overarching guide for the state; strategy is just how some individual 
or group is going to accomplish a major and/or long-term goal. While the lack of a grand 
strategy makes it difficult to effectively use military tools such as building partner 
capacity to advance the well-being of the nation, individual strategic objectives may still 
be served by building partner capacity. For example, the United States had strategic 
objectives to reduce the amount of drugs entering the United States and to prevent the 
overthrow of the Colombian state by the FARC. Whether these were useful objectives is 
informed by the state’s grand strategy, but either way, having decided on such objectives 
the state had to choose how to pursue them. Building partner capacity was one of the 
means by which to do so, and it was effective in preventing the overthrow of the 
Colombian state (though it was not effective in reducing the flow of drugs). 
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Where the lack of a grand strategy does impact the ability of the United States to 
build partner capacity is in the area of building a partner’s capacity to design and 
implement its own grand strategy. Bruneau rightly points out that unless the United States 
redevelops its own ability to create and implement grand strategy, it will not be able to 
help other states do the same. This is an important point, but for the purposes of this 
thesis, what is significant is the ability of the United States to build partner capacity in 
furtherance of specific goals (specifically its ability to improve the effectiveness of the 
Colombian military). 
For those who support the idea that building partner capacity is a useful tool for 
the United States, Plan Colombia is often touted as an example of capacity-building done 
right. Even within this one example, however, there is disagreement, and whether U.S. 
military training efforts had a positive effect is certainly not well established. 
Additionally, the effects of U.S. military training in Colombia, as distinct from other 
types of aid (such as monetary, counter-drug, social development), are not well 
examined, and all areas suffer from a lack of empirical study. Similar to the literature on 
Plan Colombia generally, opinions on U.S. military efforts tend to fall into either a 
strongly positive, or a strongly negative camp. The article mentioned earlier by Dube and 
Naidu on U.S. military aid provides an example of the negative camp. While the article 
does not separate military training from other forms of aid such as monetary and 
equipment donations, and it does not indicate why U.S. training efforts might have failed, 
the findings do suggest that training was ineffective since it failed to reduce paramilitary 
or guerrilla attacks in areas with military bases compared with areas lacking military 
bases.177  
Moyar, Pagan, and Griego present an explanation claiming nearly the opposite of 
Dube and Naidu’s, representing the positive camp. For these authors, training by U.S. 
special operations forces increased Colombian military capacity and led to considerable 
success in fighting the illegally armed groups and reducing human rights violations.178 
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Others question whether U.S. military training was even needed. This hypothesis 
starts by observing that Colombia decided on its own, before the U.S. entered into Plan 
Colombia, to revamp and professionalize its military to fight the insurgency. It then 
asserts that Colombia did not need U.S. instruction on how to fight a jungle insurgency 
(something it had been doing for a long time), what Colombia needed was to find the 
political will to conduct the fight and some monetary help to allow it to do so.179 
B. COLOMBIA AS A CASE STUDY 
Plan Colombia provides a useful case to study for a couple of reasons. First, 
although U.S. military assistance to, and cooperation with, Colombia stretches back to the 
late 1930s, Plan Colombia represents a substantial increase in U.S. resources over 
previous efforts.180 Since signing onto the plan in 2000, the United States has provided 
significant support to Plan Colombia, including a huge amount of aid and equipment, and 
thousands of trainers and advisors to the Colombian military and government.181 In 
financial terms, from fiscal year 2000 through fiscal year 2014, the United States spent 
about $9.5 billion in support of Plan Colombia and its successor programs.182 While this 
is a massive amount, it is worth noting that Colombia’s own share was considerably 
larger. To contrast the shares of the partners, Stuart Lippe explains that “between 2000 
and 2006, the GOC spent $20 billion on the military and police (not including pensions 
and other non-military expenditures), while the United States provided $3 billion.”183 
Concerning the United States’ personnel contributions, Isacson describes the limits set on 
U.S. troop numbers in Colombia: “When Plan Colombia was approved in 2000, Congress 
placed legal caps on the numbers of military personnel and civilian contractors who could 
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be in Colombia at any given time. Four years later the military cap has been raised from 
400 to 800, and the contractor cap has been raised from 400 to 600.”184 These caps do 
not, however, necessarily represent the actual number of personnel in the country. 
Finding accurate numbers for historical troop deployments is difficult, but according to a 
2009 interview with the U.S. ambassador to Colombia, U.S. troop presence in Colombia 
reached a peak of approximately 500 personnel in the mid-2000s and declined in the late 
2000s to about 250 personnel.185 For perspective on these numbers, it is useful to look at 
other troop deployments around the world. Honduras hosts the 500–600 U.S. service 
members of Joint Task Force-Bravo (whose mission, according to the unit’s website, is 
“to build partnerships with Honduras and other Central American countries to foster 
security, stability, and prosperity for the Americas”).186 In the Philippines, several 
hundred U.S. special operations forces advise and support host-nation counter-terrorist 
operations (this is in addition to the thousands of U.S. military personnel that visit the 
country on exercises that are meant to enhance both U.S. and Philippine military 
capacity).187 In the first half of the 2000s, approximately 30 countries world-wide hosted 
100 or more U.S. troops, and about 15 countries hosted 1000 or more (these numbers 
seem to include only troops in permanent billets, as opposed to those on temporary 
duty—even long-term temporary duty—which means the actual number of troops in a 
country at a given time could potentially be considerably higher).188  
Having made the massive donations of aid just mentioned, the United States 
should ask whether the aid to Colombia accomplished much, and whether the nature of 
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that aid holds its own lessons learned (also a useful question for other donors of foreign 
aid). To put it another way, Plan Colombia represents an opportunity to learn both about 
how to execute a mission to build partner capacity, and whether such a mission should 
even be attempted.  
The second reason Plan Colombia is a useful subject of study is that it represents 
a country that has managed to push back its insurgency (if not completely defeat it). As 
Lippe states, “Colombia’s remarkable recovery from its low point in the late 1990s makes 
it an important case study.”189 The successful (and failed) techniques of Colombia’s 
counterinsurgency may be applicable to other conflicts around the world, and there are 
plenty of opportunities where such lessons could be applied. Numerous weak or failing 
states are plagued by insurgencies and the United States and other wealthy nations 
frequently find that some national interest is attached to the fate of the faltering states. 
Understanding what is effective in dealing with an insurgency, and what is ineffective, 
and what are the trade-offs of various courses of action, is important for all parties. It is 
true that the situation in each country is different and that there is no single blueprint for 
counterinsurgency. Nonetheless, diverse states can learn from each other even when their 
problems are not exactly the same. Afeikhena Jerome, a member of the Nigeria 
Governors Forum, makes just this point when he describes useful lessons from 
Colombia’s fight against the FARC for his country’s own fight against Boko Haram.190 
Lessons on building partner capacity have substantial relevancy in the current day 
thanks to the many places in which such efforts are taking place. From the battlefields of 
Iraq to the offices of security cooperation in embassies around the world, representatives 
of the U.S. military are involved in a huge range of efforts to assist partner nations, and 
all of those representatives, plus the policy-makers directing them, need to understand 
what will help, and what will hurt, the partner nation in question.  
The experience of Plan Colombia can help improve the understanding of 
capacity-building operations, but as Bryan Batson observes, “the work of the U.S. 
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military in Colombia is understudied.”191 It is true that it is standard practice for military 
teams to write after-action reports following training or other operations with partner 
nations so that lessons learned are captured and passed on. Unfortunately, these reports, 
though numerous, are frequently hard to find, even for other members of the military. 
Furthermore, they tend to have a limited scope, dealing with specific training events, and 
they are usually focused on the tactical level. Systematic studies that consolidate the 
wealth of knowledge that exists in the aggregate are rare, thus making it difficult for 
lessons to be learned, especially for those operating at the strategic level. 
C. THE EFFECTS OF U.S. CAPACITY-BUILDING IN COLOMBIA 
Though rare, as just mentioned, some systematic studies do exist. The work by 
Moyar, Pagan, and Griego is one such study. Published by Joint Special Operations 
University, the report is focused on the activities of, and lessons learned for, U.S. special 
operations forces. Although this focus omits the conventional forces of the U.S. military, 
the report is still quite useful because it is the special operations forces that are primarily 
responsible for training and advising foreign militaries (though interest in using 
conventional forces for this purpose is growing). Robert D. Ramsey III’s paper, From El 
Billar to Operations Fenix and Jaque, provides another good, systematic study of the 
military experience during Plan Colombia, with insights from both the Colombian and 
U.S. perspectives. 
What these studies and others like them suggest is that the U.S. military effort was 
largely successful, and that this success came despite, or even because of, the relatively 
small, supporting role of the U.S. military aid. As Moyar, Pagan, and Griego write, “U.S. 
aid contributed to the dramatic turnaround in Colombian performance that began in 1998, 
but U.S. assistance was not the decisive factor.”192 Plan Colombia was a Colombian 
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project, led by Colombia.193 U.S. government support amounted to billions of dollars, 
extensive donations of equipment, and training for tens of thousands of Colombian 
security forces members, but even with these large numbers U.S. aid composed a small 
part of the overall effort expended, and required, in Colombia. As Isacson points out, “the 
entire aid package to Colombia—both military and economic—adds up to only 0.8% of 
Colombia’s GDP.”194 With security sector budget allocations in Colombia amounting to 
over 5% of GDP during the mid-2000s (the period referenced by Isacson), the U.S. 
contribution constitutes a boost of approximately 15%.195 This was enough to be 
important, but as mentioned, not enough to be decisive. What the monetary aid did 
accomplish was the sustainment of Colombian programs and operations, allowing the 
Colombian military to continue its fight in places and at times when it might otherwise 
have struggled.  
Likewise, the military training and education programs made significant 
contributions to the Colombian military, but they were only part of the progress for 
Colombia. The U.S. provided training to 67,391 Colombian military members from FY 
1999 through FY 2013, an average of 4,493 Colombians trained each year, with a total 
value of $249,782,424 for the training provided.196 The Colombian military, however, 
stood at almost 260,000 members in 2007, having grown from around 154,000 in 1999, 
meaning that the majority of Colombian troops never received direct U.S. training.197 
Nonetheless, Moyar, Pagan, and Griego observe that the U.S. training was valuable to 
Colombia in areas such as “intelligence, planning, reconnaissance, communications, 
close-quarters combat, heavy weapons, and combat medicine,” as well as in critical 
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aviation skills.198 Even so, in a May 2013 interview with Moyar, Pagan, and Griego, 
General (Retired) Carlos Alberto Ospina Ovalle, who served as commander of the 
Colombian Army and then as Commander of all of the Colombian Armed Forces, 
observed that “the most important thing that Colombia gained from U.S. military 
assistance was the transfer of culture. The Americans served as our role models. We 
watched their behavior, their discipline, their humility, and their commitment to their 
country, and tried to emulate them.”199 Ramsey comes to similar findings in his work: 
“while senior Colombian Military leaders and MOD officials acknowledged the 
importance of U.S. assistance, several focused not on the amount of money or training or 
equipment—all of which they said were useful. Instead, they cited two things: the 
importance of being treated with professional respect and the value of interacting with 
U.S. military personnel.”200 The presence of, and interaction with, the respected and 
powerful U.S. military enhanced the morale of the Colombian military (good morale 
being important to the success of any fighting force) and gave the Colombians a broader 
source of knowledge from which to draw solutions for their country’s problems.201  
The supporting, relatively small role of the United States should not be viewed as 
a negative. Rather, this is as it should be. Many of the problems in the Colombian 
military come from sources that the United States cannot address.202 As one example, the 
Colombian military is a reflection of the country’s highly stratified civil society, and the 
lack of mobility up the ranks poses a problem for growing competent leaders.203 The 
United States can point out such problems, but the impetus and methods for changing the 
system have to come from within the Colombian military.204  
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By helping where able—but without taking over the problem—the United States 
made it more likely that an enduring solution would be found. Such a strategy is not a 
guarantee of success, and it can certainly be slow and frustrating for all involved, but it 
ensures that the people who have the most at stake and who understand the problem best 
are the ones who provide the solutions. John Waghelstein, a U.S. veteran of advising 
efforts in El Salvador, sums up the issue succinctly: “It is their war and they must win it 
… We probably cannot deliver victory from outside and if we can, it probably is 
transitory.”205 The lesson of Colombia is that to be successful in building partner 
capacity, the United States must truly be a partner, and a minor one at that. The United 
States must exercise restraint and patience so that the solution can be developed from the 
inside, rather than being imposed by an outside power. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This thesis analyzed whether or not the actions of the Colombian military 
improved the security of Colombian citizens during Plan Colombia. Military actions are 
often interpreted in terms of their effect on the security of the state, but the concern of 
this thesis was whether the benefits of military security actions outweighed the costs 
specifically for Colombian citizens. The thesis argued that for the citizens, the benefits of 
the Colombian military’s involvement came in various forms including a greatly 
weakened insurgency and increased state presence across Colombia’s territory. These are 
balanced against the costs, which included military human rights abuses against civilians 
and massive levels of migration, with resulting poverty, due to the fighting involving the 
military, insurgent groups, and paramilitaries. Considerable disagreement exists over the 
value of the military’s involvement, as it does over many other aspects of Plan Colombia, 
including basic questions such as whether or not security improved and what were the 
sources of insecurity. This thesis added to the understanding of the security situation in 
Colombia, with a focus on the effects of military counterinsurgency operations on the 
lives of normal civilians, while also giving some attention to what the Colombian 
experience can tell the United States about its involvement in counterinsurgencies, 
especially its use of U.S. military members to train or advise foreign forces. Overall this 
thesis found that the use of the Colombian military during Plan Colombia increased 
citizen security, and furthermore that the United States played a positive role in this 
outcome. 
In examining the issue, this thesis began by defining citizen security as the 
protection of life and of people’s physical and material integrity, and then explored some 
of the main sources of insecurity in Colombia. With the focus of the thesis being on the 
military, the sources of insecurity that were emphasized were those over which the 
military had the greatest potential impact, namely the insurgent groups and paramilitaries. 
These several armed groups created considerable insecurity for Colombians through a 
wide range of actions, including assassinations, kidnappings, extortion, and 
indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets. Improving security required the state to both 
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degrade the ability of the illegal armed groups to carry out their crimes, and to re-
establish its own presence throughout the country in order to provide continuing security 
and development services. Improved funding, equipment, and manpower for the military, 
as well as reforms in training and operations allowed the Colombian military to 
significantly weaken the illegal armed groups, and to regain large amounts of territory for 
the state, thus leading to a marked decrease in the crimes having the greatest negative 
effect on citizen security. 
After investigating the Colombian security situation and the arguments for how 
and why the military improved the situation, this thesis discussed some of the main 
counterarguments. First was the concern that the national-level data used to support the 
argument is not sufficient to establish a causal link between military actions and 
improved security. This is a valid critique; unfortunately, the localized data that would 
serve to prove or disprove the hypothesis is hard to come by. In the absence of localized 
data, authors are forced to do the best they can with national level numbers. 
The next critique pointed out that although it is meant to protect citizens, the 
military itself committed human rights abuses during Plan Colombia. This thesis agrees 
that these abuses occurred and that they were appalling, the more so for being committed 
by an organization whose raison d'être is the protection of its country’s citizens. 
However, despite the terrible nature of the false positive murders, the overall effect of the 
military remained beneficial. This is true both because the total number of lives lost by 
Colombian civilians was greatly reduced, and because the military maintained the 
legitimacy to continue its proper work, even after the false positives scandal came to 
light. 
The last of the principal critiques addressed by this thesis was that Plan Colombia 
helped elite interests while harming rural and poor Colombians. While Colombia is 
certainly a place with a tremendous amount of inequality—as explained in Chapter III—
the sources of the inequality, and the inequality itself, existed before Plan Colombia. 
Moreover, during Plan Colombia, the gap between poor and wealthy actually decreased 
(albeit insufficiently to answer the concerns of those fighting for economic and social 
justice, or to create a strong sense of loyalty to the state by those on the poor end of the 
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economic scale). The point is that Plan Colombia and the military did not create the 
problem; rather they created a secure environment in which the problem could be 
addressed. 
After examining the Colombian military’s role in citizen security during Plan 
Colombia, this thesis briefly examined the role of the U.S. military during the plan. There 
is much to be studied concerning the U.S military’s actions and effects in Colombia, and 
more research should be done on this topic. Unfortunately, the amount of study 
conducted so far is limited. Even so, there are some lessons that can be drawn from the 
U.S. experience. The primary lesson is that the U.S. military served a beneficial role by 
providing assistance in areas where the Colombian military was weak (such as in 
communications, intelligence, and aviation), while remaining in a small enough role that 
the Colombians could produce a Colombian solution to Colombian problems. 
In the end, the security picture in Colombia, and the military’s effect on security, 
is a complicated and fluctuating one: there were security gains in some areas, but 
setbacks in others, and the dramatic gains of the early 2000s have been offset somewhat 
by losses over the last several years. In spite of this, there is a strong case for the positive 
role of the military in the pursuit of citizen security during Plan Colombia. The military’s 
successes against the insurgency precipitated a significant decline in some of the most 
egregious crimes (such as murder, massacre, and kidnapping), and the successes also 
provided the environment in which the rest of the state could do its share. (Whether the 
rest of the state performed, does not reflect on the military.) The military may not have 
completely defeated the insurgencies, nor did it take back all of the ungoverned territory, 
but it made impressive gains (especially considering the conditions under which it started 
in the 1990s). The experience of Plan Colombia demonstrates that a country’s military 
can play a positive role in the provision of citizen security, and that the U.S. military can 
be of assistance in such an effort. 
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